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The first years of the 21st century have been marked by an increasingly extreme hyperpartisan 
environment, gripping the federal government and its legislative representatives. The result has been an 
increasingly ineffectual U.S. Congress, for which public approval ratings are at record lows and frustrations 
seemingly at all-time highs. The following chapters will examine how this hyperpartisan environment has either 
hastened or enabled fundamental changes/shifts in the practice of U.S. democracy. Each chapter will examine a 
change or challenge through the lens of a high-priority issue (gun control, immigration, and marijuana prohibition), 
issues for which there is intense public pressure for a policy response. In each case, policy that Congress has been 
unwilling, or unable, to produce. As the people’s branch, Congress should represent and reflect the will of their 
constituents. Despite growing (and in some cases overwhelming) bipartisan public support of particular policy 
reforms, Congress remains stalemated. However, the conclusions of this portfolio prove more complex than 
anticipated. Ultimately, although hyperpartisanship is now a factor in policy stalemate, it appears it is as much a 
symptom of broader issues as it is a cause. Certain aspects of, and evolutions in, the system’s design have 
exacerbated a problem that has always existed - people just don’t always agree. As the “People’s Branch,” 
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“Stark partisan polarization is arguably the defining characteristic of our current political moment. While 
other periods in American history have also featured incivility and deep divides… today the divide between parties 
not only encumbers coalition-building and policy-making, but also even how regular people work and shop.” Gregory 
Eady, Justin S. Vaughn, and Brandon Rottinghaus, Brookings Institution1 
 
On the heels of one of the century’s most extreme displays of partisan politics, many Americans were left 
feeling frustrated and weary from what has felt a long and protracted partisan battle of us versus them. Despite hours 
of impassioned arguments, the impeachment trial of President Trump did little to sway Senators, or voters, on either 
side of the aisle. Both Democrats and Republicans remained steadfast in their presuppositions, no matter how 
articulately or convincingly an argument to the contrary was made. The eventual, and expected, acquittal of the 
President on both counts was a (nearly) perfect display of party lines. The trial had the potential to put the best of U.S. 
democracy on display, a representative elected body transformed into a room of impartial jurors, presided by the 
highest member of the highest court, prepared to listen, absorb, and cast a crucial vote arrived at through much 
deliberation and critical thinking. The trial could have been an exercise intended to protect the sanctity of the 
democratic institution, one which could have made the Founders proud. The trial had the potential to renew public 
faith in the system. Instead, throughout the trial, the debate “remain[ed] highly polarized and rancorous and seem[ed] 
unlikely to convince many observers that a new era of political civility and compromise [was] upon us.” Americans 
emerged from the trial with their worst fears cemented, “dysfunctional government, and dysfunctional elected leaders, 
constitute the country's biggest problems.”2 
This is certainly not a new phenomenon. The public’s dissatisfaction with government has steadily grown 
since the beginning of the 21st century, “[a]mid House Democrats' impeachment inquiry into President Donald 
Trump's dealings with Ukraine, a near-record-high 34% of Americans cite the government, poor leadership or 
politicians as the most important problem currently facing the U.S.”3 This high was only one percentage point shy of 
the record high which occurred earlier in 2019, following the longest government shutdown in history. Americans 
have grown increasingly frustrated and distrustful of their government and their representative body, Congress.  
                                               
1 Gregory Eady, Justin S. Vaughn, and Brandon Rottinghaus, “Comparing Trump to the greatest—and the most polarizing—presidents in US 
history,” brookings.edu, March 20, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/03/20/comparing-trump-to-the-greatest-and-the-most-
polarizing-presidents-in-u-s-history/.  
2 Frank Newport, “Impeachment From the American Public's Perspective,” gallup.com, January 24, 2020, 
https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/284030/impeachment-american-public-perspective.aspx.  






Congress, the people’s branch, should be the arm of government most intimate with the will of the people. 
However, the perception that Congress is unable to fulfill this will continues to grow. Americans are suffering a “crisis 
of confidence”4 in democracy, increasingly convinced that the system is broken, “dissatisfaction with democracy is 
rooted in the belief that democracy is not working – that it is unable or unwilling to deal with citizens’ demands and 
concerns. And there is evidence the dissatisfied are right: over time, politicians, parties and governments have become 
less responsive to a broad cross-section of citizens.”5 As the impeachment trial demonstrated to an extreme, 
partisanship has so firmly gripped Congressional representatives in Washington D.C. that the bipartisan cooperation 
and coalition required to find policy solutions to the country’s most pressing issues seems a thing of the distant past. 
American citizens are left to believe that Congress simply can’t “get things done” anymore.  
This begs an important and consequential question. How have the extreme polarization and hyperpartisanship 
of the 21st century fundamentally changed critical and primary features of U.S. democracy and what does this mean 
for the future of the same? Do the worst and most hyperbolic headlines of the day (i.e. “Democracy is Fighting for its 
Life”, “Is US Politics Beyond the Point of Repair?”, or “American Democracy is Broken”) portend something 
accurate?  
As is further explored in chapter one, partisanship is a necessary and important part of American 
democracy. At the time of the country’s founding, James Madison cautioned how certain aspects of human nature 
have “divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed 
to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good.”6 In a representative democracy, political 
parties play an important role in representing individual constituent beliefs about consequential and controversial 
issues. The debates, and policy efforts, surrounding these issues are, and should be, rigorous, challenging, and 
heated. However, increasingly since the start of the 21st century, political conversations have become polarized and 
uncivil.  
Public perception and polling data show that “the dominant incentive in politics right now is to capitalize 
on animosity to the opposition party... hatred, anger and animosity have proven the most effective tools to mobilize 
                                               
4 “The Democracy Project: Reversing a Crisis of Confidence,” The Democracy Project, 2018, https://www.democracyprojectreport.org/report 
(accessed February 7, 2020). 
5 Sheri Berman, “Why are we so dissatisfied with democracy? The reasons are many,” The Guardian, December 22, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/dec/22/why-are-we-so-dissatisfied-with-democracy-the-reasons-are-many.  





support.”7 According to a Pew Research Center poll, “demonization — vilification — of political opponents has 
become entrenched.”8 A 2019 Pew Research Center Poll indicated that although the 2016 presidential campaign 
marked a time of "intense partisan division and animosity,” levels of division and animosity between members of 
opposing parties have continued to deepen.9 Further, the poll found that "partisan hostility extends beyond politics... 
[m]ajorities in both parties say those in the opposing party do not share their nonpolitical values and goals.”10 Thus, 
in the context of this thesis, the hyperpartisanship of the 21st century should be understood to be the intense, hostile, 
and insurmountable partisanship that has permeated not only Congress but nearly every facet of American life. In 
fact, another recent survey indicated that with political polarization and antipathy at historic highs, "many single 
people looking for a relationship wouldn’t want to date someone who voted for the candidate of the opposing party 
in the 2016 presidential election.”11 
According to Madison, in the face of this “mutual animosity,” public views should be “refine[d] and 
enlarge[d]... by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the 
true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary 
or partial considerations.”12 Despite partisanship and polarization amongst the American public holding at modern 
highs, there are some issues on which there is agreement regarding their priority for policy reform or for which there 
is growing bipartisan support. However, as previously discussed, Congress has not been immune to the 
extraordinary partisanship that has overcome the U.S. in recent years. As Americans struggle to engage in civil 
conversations at the dinner table, Congress has seemingly lost its ability to engage in constructive, collaborative, and 
productive partisanship on Capitol Hill. 
It is worth acknowledging, at this point, that despite the hyperbolic headlines and tone of this introduction, 
Congress has passed some legislation, even over the last 3-4 years when partisanship has been on its most extreme 
                                               








11 Anna Brown, ” Most Democrats who are looking for a relationship would not consider dating a Trump voter,” Pew Research Center, April 24, 
2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/24/most-democrats-who-are-looking-for-a-relationship-would-not-consider-dating-a-
trump-voter/. 





display. In 2019, legislators introduced an impressive (by 21st century standards) 8,820 bills and joint resolutions, 
more than at any other point in the last four decades.13 However, only 105 laws were enacted, which is “among the 
lowest in this millennium, exceeding only the 72 new laws of 2013 and 81 of 2011. Given the large number of bills 
introduced, this Congress is on track to enact a lower percentage of bills than any in modern times.”14 The rate of 
legislative progress as it relates to major policy issues and reforms is even more glum.  
The research contained in the following three chapters aims to address this very idea. The hyperpartisanship 
and extreme polarization gripping our country, and most importantly Congress, has fundamentally changed the way 
policy is made. Congress, so consumed with party lines and assigned narratives, has been rendered inept in addressing 
the issues most important to the American public. The bipartisan collaboration and cooperation that is needed to 
address these issues of real consequence is a distant memory. As national and global landscapes shift, Congress must 
be prepared not only to address and legislate issues of administrative significance (budgets and the like), but also to 
design and reform policy that helps define what it means to be an American, both at home and in the world. This type 
of policy-making and reform requires the ability to set aside party differences to do the work of the American public. 
If Congress has lost the ability to overcome this challenge the consequences to the health of democracy are severe. 
Through the lens of mass shootings, chapter one assesses whether or not hyperpartisanship is responsible for 
the lack of meaningful policy reform and if it has fundamentally shifted the conditions previously believed to be 
required for the mechanisms of the U.S.’s democratic policy machine to engage. Over the last two decades, several 
events have resulted in mass casualties and have prompted immediate and continued public demand for a policy 
response. These events generally elicit bipartisan concern and require a focus on broader issues. Why did these events 
not prompt real and significant policy change and what does this mean for American democracy?  
By examining the democratic function of policy making, the theory behind agenda setting in the policy 
making process, the hyperpartisan political environment, and finally, mass casualty events as focusing events, chapter 
one proposed that a hyperpartisan Washington D.C. is responsible for policy deadlock. And further, that a sustained 
partisan environment shifted the conditions previously believed to be sufficient to open a window of opportunity in 
which meaningful policy change can occur. Several case studies are examined to explore these dynamics and 
                                               






illuminate a potential shift in the democratic processes. In a political system that is dependent on cooperation and 
responsiveness to the electorate, the broader consequences to U.S. democracy would be significant.  
Ultimately, with the exception of a few and limited examples, chapter one found that there did appear to be 
a problem of some significance at the Congressional level.  More specifically, in the context of Kingdon’s theory on 
public policy, Congress appeared to generally be incapable of capitalizing on policy windows, although it did not 
appear that the conditions required to open the window themselves had changed. 
An examination of the issue through the lens of mass shootings as focusing events revealed that the issue is 
about more than just partisanship, polarization, and rhetoric. However, in the case of mass shootings and gun control, 
the hyperpartisanship that has emerged over the last 20 years appears to be the factor that makes it impossible to 
overcome the others (e.g., such as strong opposing lobbies, thinner margins of power, concerns about self-preservation, 
the 24-hour news cycle, and the polarized nature of the issue itself). 
Ultimately, the conclusions of chapter one were not nearly as straightforward as anticipated, but in the case 
of mass shootings, and in particular the Parkland shooting, an encouraging and promising trend emerged. The inaction 
at the federal legislative level inspired states to intervene and enact laws in instances when Congress remained 
unwilling and unable. Perhaps a signal of a new and more tenable trend in U.S. democracy, one in which federal law 
takes a back seat to state legislation. 
Traditionally certain issues and rights have been reserved for the federal government. However, as was 
identified in chapter one, states were effectively able to legislate more restrictive gun control measures following 
several mass shootings, when Congress was not. In the face of an ineffectual and paralyzingly polarized Congress, is 
a possible and viable alternative for states to localize and legislate traditionally federal issues?  
Chapter two attempts to address this very question through the lens of immigration. Immigration is an issue 
which has traditionally been within the purview of the federal government and has become one of the most divisive 
and highest priority issues facing Congress, and the administration. By examining the foundations of American 
federalism and division of power between state and federal, historical precedents for adoption of national issues on 
the state level, and utilizing immigration as a test case, chapter two proposed that in the face of a hyperpartisan 
Washington D.C., states will be challenged to creatively endeavor to take on policy projects far beyond their 





The conclusions of chapter two showed some of the presuppositions held true, hyperpartisanship has a hold 
on Congress and a real effect on policy (or the lack thereof), for immigration reform. Federal inaction on immigration 
was a familiar refrain amongst those pursuing both permissive and restrictive sub-federal legislation. Immigration 
federalism was also bolstered by a number of court decisions which denied that sub-federal legislation ran afoul of 
federal supremacy and/or preemption. However, there also appeared to be limited empirical evidence supporting the 
success of the sub-federal efforts, which left the strong rhetoric that inspired and supported the efforts largely 
unsubstantiated and raised big questions about the advisability of piecemeal/patchwork efforts in a nation that is built 
on the unification of diverse parts. Additionally, many of the sub-federal efforts themselves appeared to have partisan 
origins. Despite this, a trend emerged. Generally permissive efforts fared much better as compared to restrictive 
efforts. Efforts that aimed for inclusiveness and integration withstood legal challenges at a much better rate than did 
those that were exclusionary and created environments inhospitable to immigrants (both legal and illegal alike).  
One additional trend that emerged from the research supporting chapter two was the outsized influence “issue 
entrepreneurs” played in the immigration debate, “[i]ssue entrepreneurs took advantage of circumstances, such as 
extreme political polarization after the contested 2000 presidential election and the rise of border security concerns 
after 9/11, to spread attrition through enforcement, or self-deportation, laws throughout the country. These issue 
entrepreneurs first blocked immigration reform at the national level and then simultaneously used federal inaction as 
an excuse to push the attrition-through-enforcement agenda at the state and local levels.”15 
Has hyperpartisanship created an environment in which enterprising individuals are better able to seize 
emotionally charged issues, rooted in discussions of morality, during times of political opportunity to push a particular 
policy agenda. Is this phenomenon of issue “influencers” and their capacity to drive policy direction in the 
hyperpartisan 21st century unique? And has it left U.S. democracy more vulnerable? 
Chapter three turns to the evolution of the prohibition of marijuana over the years as a case study of the issue, 
to examine the possibility that the prohibition of marijuana has persisted not for reasons rooted in science and logic, 
but due to the influence of some underlying interest, motivated by profit or power, emboldened by the political 
opportunity presented by a hyperpartisan environment. Has the issue of marijuana legalization, like other issues and 
                                               
15 Karthick Ramakrishnan and Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “Understanding Immigration Federalism in the United States,” Center for American 




failed efforts at moral legislation through prohibition, been hijacked and exploited by some other underlying interest 
to a far greater cost than benefit?  
Calls for reform of the war on drugs, and in particular the decriminalization of marijuana, have gotten louder 
and louder. As of the writing of chapter three, medicinal marijuana was legal in 33 states and recreational marijuana 
legal in eleven states and Washington D.C. Clearly, there is a movement amongst the states away from prohibition 
and toward legalization or decriminalization and this movement is widely supported (according to a recent poll, 62% 
of Americans state they support legalizing marijuana).16  
By examining the existing literature on prohibition in the historical context, the role “issue entrepreneurs” or 
representatives of special interests have played, as well as the theory behind the legislation of moral issues, chapter 
three examined whether or not issues rooted in morality suffer a particular vulnerability to the agendas of special 
interests, particularly during times of social upheaval and partisan divisions. 
The final chapter in this portfolio confirmed many of the evolving concerns, specifically the intractability of 
the current political environment, and more exactly the forces that have prevented policy successes on the issues 
Americans care about and demand action on the most. The chapter also examined the potential for an issue to become 
representative and mythological, how an incredibly powerful narrative is capable of supporting years, decades, 
perhaps even a century, of public policy, even if its results are found to be destructive. As previous chapters explored, 
both gun policy and immigration policy are also similarly rooted. These roots make it more difficult to stray from the 
narrative than it is on other issues which are less tied to existential fears. 
As it relates to issue entrepreneurs, the issue of marijuana legalization also highlighted how controversial 
issues can be exploited to promote an individual’s ends. Chapter two and three revealed that issue entrepreneurs need 
not be individuals who are themselves in positions of great power, or even particularly swayed by the issue itself. 
Rather, the issue became a means to a more personal end - as was the case of Henry Anslinger, who conspired to 
develop a narrative that would support his failing Bureau of Narcotics. Each of the individuals profiled in chapter 
three had an outsized influence on both marijuana policy and the public’s perception of the same, due in part to a 
confluence of circumstances and happenstance - being in the right place (position) at the right (critical and/or culturally 
vulnerable) time in history.  But motivations were more difficult to unpack. In each instance, personal gain appeared 
                                               





at least as important as any moral or scientifically supported commitment to further demonization or continued 
prohibition. 
Additionally, as public support for legalization has grown, so has the hyperpartisan environment in 
Washington. Although Congress too has seen an increase in support for tackling the issue, the greater issue, related to 
partisanship, seems to be the distraction the hyperpartisan environment has created. With Congress busy tackling 
highly partisan debates ranging from immigration, war, and impeachment, there is little time and/or energy to devote 
to an issue of seemingly less urgency.  
 The topic at hand is certainly, and obviously, too ambitious to sufficiently cover in the next three chapters 
alone. However, in the pages that follow, this paper endeavors to tease out whether there are the features of a real and 
consequential shift in certain fundamental aspects of American democracy and whether or not hyperpartisanship is to 
blame. In turn, the research and findings suggest areas of future focus and potential solutions to one of the most 











The Long Road: From Public Problem to Public Policy 
The Effects of Extreme Partisanship on the Policy Making Process 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
The 2016 election resulted in what many might describe as a partisan fever pitch.17 Civility, social 
tolerance, constructive discourse, cooperation, and the ability to simply agree to disagree seem qualities of a distant 
democratic past. One only needs to peruse the daily feed on their Facebook or Twitter account to sense the general 
malaise that has come to rest on the American electorate. A sense of frustration has permeated not only politics but 
more recently, nearly every aspect and relationship in one’s life: friends, family, and co-workers alike. This general 
sense of the degradation of common ground also seems to have origins at the top, with the nation’s highest 
lawmakers engaging in the same partisan bickering one might find at the Thanksgiving table. This begs an obvious 
question. Does it matter?  
Due to its design (simple majority, single ballot system), U.S. democracy has always been a virtually two-
party system, with little room for third parties and independents.18 Thus, bipartisanship has become a necessary 
feature of this system, both sides coming together on national issues of major import. However, the current climate 
in American politics appears to be undeniably partisan and divided.19  
It is not the first time, the U.S. has overcome periods of incredible divisiveness before, including during the 
Civil War and desegregation.20 21 However, there appears to be something unique about the current period. There is 
not a singular issue on which there is little consensus or extreme disagreement. Rather the divisiveness appears to 
have permeated nearly every topic or issue, including those that would have previously presented little controversy. 
Over the last two decades, as the American public has grown increasingly frustrated with lawmakers in 
Washington D.C.22, a spotlight has been cast on numerous issues of national importance. Issues for which the 
American public appears anxious to see a public policy response, but Congress has been unable, or unwilling, to find 
                                               
17 Clare Foran, “America's Political Divide Intensified During Trump's First Year as President,” The Atlantic. October 5,  2017, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/trump-partisan-divide-republicans-democrats/541917/. 
18 M Duverger, “Political parties: their organization and activity in the modern state,” North, B. and North R., tr. New York: Wiley, Science Ed. 
pg. 217. as cited in Riker, William H. “The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science,” American 
Political Science Review, 76, no. 4 (1982): 753–66. 
19 Frances E. Lee, Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016, 1-2. 
20 Aaron Astor, “Partisanship is an American tradition — and good for democracy,” Washington Post, July 12, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/07/12/partisanship-is-an-american-tradition-and-good-for-
democracy/?utm_term=.ba115a5b3231.  
21 Julia Azari “Politics Is More Partisan Now, But It’s Not More Divisive,” FiveThirtyEight.com, January 18, 2018, 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/politics-is-more-partisan-now-but-its-not-more-divisive/.  




a bipartisan policy solution. One could imagine that some issues should be less controversial than others and would 
be more likely to prompt bipartisan support and generate policy change. Terrorist attacks, a mental health crisis, 
response to natural disasters, mass shootings, the opioid crisis, and the war on drugs are all examples of recent 
events or issues that have generated significant attention and for which a significant segment of the public has 
demanded a response. Each of these examples also represent a condition in which human lives were at stake or lost 
in significant numbers.  
In the last two decades, numerous events have resulted in mass casualties and have prompted immediate 
and continued public demand for response. These events generally elicit bipartisan concern and require a focus on 
broader issues. A classroom full of kindergartners in Newtown, a crowd of several thousand victims enjoying a 
country music festival in Las Vegas, and an island woefully lacking in the infrastructure and preparedness to 
respond to a hurricane of unprecedented power, all prompted significant and persistent debate about what could and 
should be done but none resulted in policy adoption. Why did these events not prompt real and significant policy 
change and what does this mean for American democracy? Is the hyperpartisan environment responsible for the lack 
of meaningful change and has it fundamentally shifted the conditions previously believed to be required for the 
mechanisms of the U.S.’s democratic policy machine to engage? 
By examining the democratic function of policy making, the theory behind agenda setting in the policy 
making process, the hyperpartisan political environment, and finally, mass casualty events as focusing events, this 
paper proposes that a hyperpartisan Washington D.C. is responsible for policy deadlock. Further, a sustained 
partisan environment has shifted the conditions previously believed to be sufficient to open a window of opportunity 
in which meaningful policy change can occur. Several case studies are examined to explore these dynamics and 
illuminate a potential shift in the democratic processes. In a political system that is dependent on cooperation and 
responsiveness to the electorate, the broader consequences to U.S. democracy may be significant.  
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
Previous research has provided a framework focused on these very issues, including the democratic 
function of policy making, the theory behind agenda setting in the policy making process, the hyperpartisan political 
environment, and finally, mass casualty events as focusing events. 




Fundamentally, Congress responds to public pressure and citizens needs in shaping public policy. When 
drafting the Constitution, the Founding Fathers viewed Congress as a representative entity created to serve and 
respond to the people. In Federalist 49, James Madison argued that members of Congress “embrace a great 
proportion of the most influential part of the society” and that the “nature of their public trust implies a personal 
influence among the people, and that they are more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties 
of the people.”23 In light of these ideas, partisanship has long played an outsized role. In this space, partisanship can 
be both good and bad, as “(f)riction creates light as well as heat.”24 Additionally, “[o]ur Constitution invites 
constructive partisanship, including often cantankerous, cacophonous, contentious partisanship. The principal 
differences between our two great parties, whether over the war on terrorism, health care reform, or global warming, 
matter, and they are often principled differences.”25 
In Federalist 10, Madison states that a “zeal for different opinions” among other things, has “divided 
mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and 
oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good.”26 It is due to the very nature of the U.S. federal 
system that parties both “constitut[e] and ... corrup[t] our politics. [The] Constitution checks and balances special 
interests and political parties, but the Constitution also embraces and empowers special interests and political 
parties.”27 It seems then, by design, that the U.S. federal system requires political parties (and therefore the resultant 
partisanship), due to both the freedoms provided by the First Amendment but also as a check and balance to 
competing interests. Partisanship, therefore, is both desirable in a political system like the U.S.’ and a necessary part 
of the policy making process. 
If then, it is assumed that the lawmaking process in the U.S. system is unique and that its reliance on the 
two-parties is, albeit frustrating, necessary, it is then worthwhile to look at the theory behind the functional aspects 
of the policy making process. How do the parties overcome their “cantankerous” nature to affect meaningful 
change? Can theory predict the conditions necessary to bridge partisan gaps and encourage, if not demand, 
cooperation toward policy implementation? 
                                               
23 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers (accessed 10/29/2018). 
24 Cato Institute, “James Madison and the Origins of Partisanship,” Cato Policy Report, January/February 2011, https://www.cato.org/policy-
report/januaryfebruary-2011/james-madison-origins-partisanship. . 
25 Ibid. 
26 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers.  





Agenda Setting and Policy Windows 
In John Kingdon’s seminal work, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, he examines both how 
“issues get decided” but also how “they got to be issues in the first place.”28 Kingdon is principally focused on 
defining the conditions or prerequisites required to “make an idea’s time come”29 or in other words, the process 
through which an issue becomes part of the government agenda, alternatives are discarded, and actualization is 
achieved through the “final enactment of legislation.”30 
To formalize his theory, Kingdon presents a four-step process as defining public policy making. These 
steps include: (1) agenda setting; (2) specification of alternatives from which a choice will be made; (3) an 
authoritative choice from among the alternatives (i.e. legislative vote); and (4) implementation of the decision.31 
Overall, however, the decision and implementation phases are less important than the conditions necessary to 
elevate particular issues into these phases. This leads to the development of three streams of processes that function 
to elevate an issue onto the governmental agenda: “problems, policies, and politics.”32 
Kingdon also highlights the importance of the “participant” or the individuals who support the issue (higher 
profile participants increase the likelihood an issue will find itself on the agenda). Kingdon explains that an issue 
becomes a “problem” when there is a combination of the following: indicators (sign that a particular condition/issue 
exists), focusing events (i.e. disaster, major crisis, personal experience, etc., which draws additional attention to a 
condition), and finally, a feedback loop that informs decision makers (legislators) about the problem. Kingdon also 
notes the importance of “developments in the political sphere as powerful agenda setters.”33 These developments 
include changes in the national mood, elections, and influence of special interest groups.  
Notably, Kingdon recognizes that in the political stream, “[c]onsensus is built...by bargaining more than by 
persuasion.”34 Whereas persuasion is typically the method of choice within the policy stream (the process of 
selecting amongst alternatives). This has interesting implications for the thesis of this paper which looks to 
understand the lack of political progress on issues of national import. Does the hyperpartisan environment mean that 
participants are both immune to persuasion on issues and also perceive little benefit to bargaining with the perceived 
                                               
28 John W Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed. New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995, xi. 
29 Ibid, 1. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid, 2-3. 
32 Ibid, 197. 
33 Ibid, 198. 





“enemy”? Critically, according to Kingdon, there comes a time when the three streams converge and a “small and 
scarce”35 window of opportunity opens to “change, expand, or abolish certain programs.”36  
Although this paper utilizes Kingdon’s theory of public policy as its primary lens, other studies provided 
additional clarification on the public policy process. For example, viewing the public policy process as a five “stage” 
process (agenda, formulation, adoption, implementation, evaluation).37 The five-stage process emphasizes process 
participation in a sequential way. This process, however, is arguably more “dynamic and developmental” and 
“flexible” than Kingdon’s streams theory38 and can “produce variations in the style, techniques, and politics of 
policymaking”.39  
Another study presents a similar policy process framework, identifying 11 “activities”40 that define the 
policy process in a similar, yet less concise way. Ultimately the activities can be broken into 5 general categories, 
which help to conceptualize how an idea transitions to policy: (1) Problem to Government, (2) Action in 
Government, (3) Government to Problem, (4) Policy to Government, and (5) Problem Resolution or Change.41 The 
study also recognizes that, “[p]roblems result from events affecting people differently. Not all problems become 
public; not all public problems become issues; and not all issues are acted on in government.”42 Also useful is the 
study’s definition of a “public problem,” as a “human need, however identified, that cannot be met privately.”43  
The author submits that although nuanced in their approaches and language, the two additional referenced 
studies are extremely similar to Kingdon’s theory. Both offer substantial support for the theory put forth by Kingdon 
as well as the hypothesis of this paper and little contradiction. All three referenced works find that there are 
identifiable conditions/processes through which one can view major events to predict which should rise to 
governmental agendas and ultimately transform into policy. 
For example, in looking at the establishment of the Rhode Island Arts Learning Network (ALN), Ann 
Galligan and Chris Burgess attempted to address whether the ALN was able to capitalize on a “policy window” as 
defined by Kingdon. The study’s authors make an important and relevant distinction between the “policy window” 
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as defined by Kingdon and what they term a “pre-window.” At the core of the study is whether or not there is a 
relevant difference between a “true policy window”44 and the so-called “pre-window,” otherwise defined as “a 
foreshadowing...in beginning the public stage of the definition of an issue in an effort to create their own opening 
and to begin building a broad-based political constituency to support the solutions that they would eventually 
prescribe...”45 As this paper shifts to addressing several more contemporary case studies, it will be important to keep 
this distinction in mind. Can some of the legislative malaise be attributed to a lack of a true window of opportunity? 
Although one may be able to define whether or not the prerequisite conditions exist to open a policy 
window, the question of how much partisanship affects the ability to capitalize on that window still remains. Do 
differences in party composition matter to the formation of public policy in constitutional democracies? According 
to previous research, they do. “[D]ifferences in the party composition of government are causally related to 
differences in public policy.”46 
Partisan Effects on Policy Making 
With a clearer understanding of the theory behind the prerequisite conditions necessary to elevate issues to 
the governmental agenda and ultimately push them toward resolution, it is important to turn to the other element of 
the question at the heart of this paper’s thesis: the hyperpartisan environment. It is certainly possible that the 
hyperpartisan environment is the stick in the proverbial spokes of the policy process and that this environment is the 
(if not a major) reason why Kingdon’s theory regarding agenda setting and policy making appears to be stymied. 
However, for that to be true, there would need to be sufficient evidence that the environment is in fact hyperpartisan. 
This would imply the environment is more partisan than it has been during other periods of recent history, for a 
more prolonged period, and across a more diverse set of issues. 
According to a 2017 Pew Research Center poll, “[f]or more than two decades, partisan polarization has 
been a powerful force in American politics.47 Party affiliation has replaced other previously important differences 
(e.g. demographic, education, religion) as the most defining factor in where a voter stands on fundamental issues. 
The Pew study points to several findings as evidence of the growing partisanship within the two major parties, 
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including, an average 36-percentage-point gap between Republicans and Republican-leaning independents and 
Democrats and Democratic leaners (in 1994, it was only 15 points) and Donald Trump’s job approval ratings, which 
are the most polarized of any first-year president dating back to the early 1950s.48 Earlier research also showed a 
notable shift was already beginning at the start of the century.  By 2001, “greater partisan polarization in Congress 
ha[d] clarified the parties’ ideological positions for ordinary Americans, which in turn ha[d] increased party 
importance and salience on the mass level.”49 At the start of the 21st century, something unique was going on, as it 
relates to the partisan divide, “[a]lthough parties in the 1990s [were] not as central to Americans as they were in the 
1950s, they are far more important today than in the 1970s and 1980s.”50  
Coupled with the more recent survey data produced by Pew, it seems evident that these trends persevered 
over the last 20 years. In fact, a 2005 study showed that there have been important and recent changes to 
partisanship amongst political elites in the U.S., “[s]pecifically, the effect of partisanship on politicians’ vote choice 
and other political behavior has risen, and the number of issue areas where partisan conflict is present has 
increased.”51 
A natural secondary question follows: if it can be generally agreed upon that the political environment is 
more partisan now than it has been in the past, does that mean something significant to the policy process? The 
answer appears to be yes. Several studies suggest that there is a correlation between heightened partisanship and 
(lack of) progress in the policy realm. Concerning the issue of climate change, multiple studies have shown there is 
actually very little difference in Democrat and Republican opinions regarding climate change, both overwhelmingly 
believe in it. Yet climate change has become an extremely polarized and partisan issue, “Democrats and 
Republicans—both ordinary citizens and policymakers—support policies from their own party and reactively 
devalue policies from the opposing party.”52 
Other research has found that “[s]cientists are in near-universal agreement that human activity is a primary 
cause of climate change. Yet, despite this scientific consensus, the American public remains divided when it comes 
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to beliefs about human-induced climate change.”53 The results of a national survey found that partisan group identity 
leads to the politicization of science and ultimately undermines a message for which there is otherwise 
overwhelming consensus, “[w]hen it  comes  to  the  American  public, it seems as if partisan group identity reigns 
supreme.”54 
On a separate issue, terrorism, partisan identity even affects the attributes individuals assign to the 
underlying motives of violent attackers (terrorists).55 Ultimately demonstrating that partisan bias is a factor in 
individual’s understandings of the motivations of violent actors. These biases are consequential and predict levels of 
punishment as well as general attitudes toward the group to which the violent actor is perceived to belong.56 The 
significance to the public policy realm is obvious. If partisanship defines one's understanding of motivations and 
suggests a particular form of punishment, it would also likely sway opinions towards (or reluctance toward) 
enactment of policy, ”[a]s partisan polarization continues to increase, better understanding the nature, flexibility, and 
limits of partisan bias—and how to combat it—is ever-more important.”57 
Crises as Focusing Events 
Finally, through case studies, this paper endeavors to show that the extreme partisanship of the last two 
decades has fundamentally changed the conditions necessary to create policy windows, even in political 
environments that were ripe for change. Before looking at the specific examples that were alluded to in the 
introduction to this paper, it is worthwhile to address what the existing literature says about focusing events in 
general. Specifically, what the existing literature says about crises and mass casualty events as being uniquely 
dynamic in the policy process. Should these events be more predictive of momentum within the policy process than 
others which are not as effective and efficient at capturing the public and government focus? 
Addressing this first from a broad perspective, this paper seeks to ascertain under what conditions 
democratic governments are able to launch reform programs, or rather “what conjunctural factors generally serve to 
open the ‘window’ for reform.”58 Previous research argues that there is, in fact, a regularity to the “window-opening 
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process” which can help one to understand “the achievements and problems of the past but also the possibilities of 
future cases.”59 Studies reference crises, further defined as a “situation of large-scale public dissatisfaction or even 
fear stemming from wide-ranging economic problems and/or an unusual degree of social unrest and/or threats to 
national security,”60 as major factors in the opening of these windows. Political leaders also use partisan rhetoric to 
create the perception of a crisis in order to advance their policy goals. Once a “problem” becomes severe enough to 
be perceived a “crisis” it is likely to have a “significant impact on the policy making process.”61 
Major natural disasters represent an important category of crises (or mass casualty events) that often 
become focusing events. It is important to note that the perceived size of the disaster is critical to whether or not a 
natural disaster becomes a focusing event, prior research finding although small disasters do not seem to induce 
significant change, a major disaster has “the potential to change dominant ways of thinking and acting.” 62 Relevant 
specifically to the U.S., Hurricane Katrina is an example of a major natural disaster for which the application of 
Kingdon’s framework is useful. A 2007 study assessed whether or not the event assisted in the opening of a policy 
window for ecological economics (finding that it did).63 Of course, whether or not policymakers were able (or 
willing) to capitalize on the policy window toward the implementation of policy change is another question entirely. 
Mass shootings and the subsequent debate around gun control also represent an important example of 
crises/mass casualty events as potential catalysts for policy change.64 Interestingly, and perhaps not uniquely, mass 
shootings can elevate not one, but several issues to the public policy agenda (i.e. gun control, race, and mental 
health).65 This raises a salient point, the more special interest an event inspires, the less attention any one particular 
issue receives. This also has interesting implications for the thesis of this paper. Perhaps this is also a major factor in 
the lack of conversions of opportunities to policies over the last two decades?  
Additionally, although focusing events may lead to an increase in the number of bills introduced in the 
House and Senate but they do not address the success rate of the passage of these bills, some prior research 
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addresses this phenomena but does little to explain the lack of actual policy change, arguing that although there is an 
identifiable increase in attention following the focusing event, attention does not equate to legislation.66 
In summary, a review of the existing literature substantially supports many elements of the thesis of this 
paper. The referenced research and analysis address the role of a bipartisan legislative body in the U.S. political 
system, the growth in partisanship over the last two decades, the theory behind the policy making process, and the 
role crises and mass casualty events can play as focusing events for the governmental policy agenda. What appears 
to be missing and what this paper will examine, by way of the following case studies, is why certain well-positioned 
(contextually and temporally) events have not produced the policy change the existing policy process theory should 
predict. 
METHODOLOGY: Case Studies 
 In order to examine the continued relevance of Kingdon’s theory, in the context of a hyperpartisan 
environment, this paper introduces several case studies that should function to demonstrate whether or not there has 
been a fundamental change to how public policy is (or isn’t) made. As indicated above, the case studies will be 
selected from a subset of mass casualty events: mass shootings. Although there are several categories of mass 
casualty events that would be appropriate, mass shootings have been selected for their particularly powerful effects 
on the American public and the national agenda. Through the examination of three case studies, patterns in 
legislative (in)action should emerge. These patterns should promote a better understanding of how Kingdon’s theory 
applies in the current political environment. As this paper endeavors to answer a complex question of “why” a 
particular phenomenon has developed, it will be important to consider the temporal and contextual settings in which 
the events occurred. Kingdon’s theory of agenda setting and the policy process cannot be reduced to mere statistics 
It is a theory that is dependent on less tangible and definite factors such as people, mood, and emotion. Case studies, 
which can be rich in emotive and evocative detail (in a way statistical analysis might be lacking) permit the author 
the flexibility to analyze how these factors had the power to influence (or not), within the frame of Kingdon’s 
theory. 
 This paper briefly examines the following mass shootings: Sandy Hook Elementary School, Route 91 
Harvest Festival, and Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. These shootings have been chosen from a bevy of 
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possible examples, as the last 20 years has been tragically, and unfortunately, rife with mass shootings. However, 
even against the backdrop of hundreds of examples and thousands of deaths, these examples stand apart. The three 
profiled shootings represent extremes within the genre, for the following respective reasons: choice of victim, lack 
of motive, legality of gun ownership, number of casualties, and public response. These factors are relevant because 
they represent aspects of the issue that promote legislative action. For example, if the shooting was based on a clear 
motive or a targeted victim (for personal/domestic reasons) that might discourage large scale response. An event 
such as this could be written off as a unique example (as opposed to a trend or public problem). Additionally, if the 
guns used in the attacks were obtained illegally, there might be less of an argument to be made to change policy to 
reduce access to firearms (since further regulating access to firearms would not stop people from obtaining them 
illegally). In each case, and for each of these reasons, these case studies represent focusing events which should have 
been best suited to prompt a policy window to open. The case studies will also be preceded by a brief examination 
of the events that followed the terror attacks on September 11, 2001. This paper hypothesizes that September 11 was 
a watershed moment. In the context of a hyperpartisan environment, September 11 appears to have reset the 
(extreme) conditions necessary to overcome partisanship and open a policy window. The three mass shootings 
profiled represent extremes in their own right and a better understanding of the policy (in)action following these 
events should help to determine how the policy process has been affected by growing partisanship. 
September 11 as a Watershed Event  
 September 11, 2001 is an important day in the American collective memory. On that day, at the direction of 
al-Qa’ida, 19 men of foreign origin hijacked four planes and crashed them into the World Trade Center, the 
Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania. In total, nearly 3,000 people died on the planes, at the Pentagon, and in New 
York City. September 11 represented the single most deadly terror attack in American history.67  
The effects of the attack on the American psyche were indelible. Horrifying, disturbing, and shattering are 
all adjectives that describe the immediate emotional response to the attacks,68 which forever changed the sense of 
security and isolation from foreign enemies Americans felt. Suddenly Osama Bin Laden and al-Qa’ida were at the 
proverbial front door of every American home. However, the events of September 11, and the days that followed, 
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produced another, rather incredible, reaction, “a remarkable cohesion evolved, one that brought people of all colors 
and creeds and political orientation together into a force of one mind, confident and hopeful that, as Americans all, 
this was a crisis that would be overcome.”69 
In response to a 2016 Pew survey that asked Americans to name the times or events during their lifetimes 
they felt most proud of, respondents commonly cited the national response to the September 11 attacks.70 
Respondents cited, among other things, “the way the nation united in the event’s aftermath” as a primary reason for 
their feelings of pride. In the aftermath, even Republican President George W. Bush received overwhelming 
bipartisan support, his approval rating hitting a near record high of 86%.71 
This cohesion and bipartisan cooperation also found its way into the legislature. As a result of the 
September 11 attacks, an incredibly ambitious bipartisan effort was undertaken by way of the 9/11 Commission.72 
At the end, the 9/11 Commission issued a 585 page, best-selling, report making numerous legislative 
recommendations to ensure the U.S. would never suffer another attack of the same scale again and that those 
responsible would be held accountable.73 
Arguably no other event, save Pearl Harbor, has had the same effect on Congress as did September 11.74 In 
fact, perhaps the bipartisan cooperation post-9/11 is even more extraordinary given the generally polarized and 
partisan environment of the early 21st century legislature.75 Notably, at the time there was not a strong Republican 
majority to support the initiatives of a Republican President.76 77 However, in light of the crisis, this did little to 
impede progress.  
In the aftermath of the terror attacks, Congress cast aside more controversial domestic issues and focused 
on speedy enactment of legislation to address the major concerns raised by the attacks. These were supported 
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virtually unanimously and with “no domestic political opposition.”78 Legislation included disaster relief, an airline 
bailout, airport security, intelligence reform, agency consolidation, and homeland security enforcement powers, 79 80 
“[t]he normal diversions that add so much time to the legislative process—including budget restrictions, 
partisanship, parochialism, and members’ philosophical leanings—were not ignored, but they were reduced. The 
emergency issues were generally given low-decibel, modest debate, and dispatched promptly.”81 
It seems immediately clear that the circumstances surrounding the events of September 11 and the policy 
that followed fit within the framework proposed by Kingdon. In this case, the issue, terrorism, became a national (if 
not global) “problem” in an instant on the morning of September 11, 2001. The attacks of September 11 were clearly 
a focusing event, elevating the issue to the government agenda instantly and uncontroversially. As was noted above, 
the issue (combating terrorism post 9/11, both domestically and abroad), faced virtually no domestic political 
opposition and was universally promoted and supported by the American public.  
September 11 opened an extraordinarily large window of opportunity for legislative action that, due to its 
uncontroversial nature, simultaneously presented no risk to legislators to pursue it. Despite not having the political 
circumstances one might expect necessary (large partisan majorities that matched the sitting President), this was 
overcome by the nature and scale of the event. In regard to participants, this was also largely irrelevant since 
virtually all Americans (e.g., irrespective of position, status, party, power) supported any and all efforts to remedy 
the damage that was done, to revenge the attack, and to prevent one from ever happening again. Bargaining and 
persuasion were also largely absent since there was little debate about what should be done, “[w]hen little domestic 
opposition exists, legislators have considerable leeway to defer to the president's wartime agenda, even if they differ 
over the ways and means of responding to the crisis itself. Other big issues on the agenda, as a consequence, get 
sidetracked, many even evaporating from legislators' active agendas.”82 
As evidenced by September 11, in the aftermath of a large-scale crisis, Congress, “which is both 
representative and highly sensitive,”83 is able to put aside partisan differences to affect meaningful change in the 
policy realm that responds to citizen demands. However, to Kingdon’s point, even the window opened by September 
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11 did not persist forever. Although September 11 represented the single most deadly terror attack in recorded 
history, even it did not open a persistent and long-lasting window for the “public problem” it represented. By 2002, 
“bipartisanship and the general feeling of unity in Congress began to wane.”84 The further into history the attack fell, 
the more the pressure on Congress also declined. Even though Bush’s Iraq War kept the specter of 9/11 alive and 
well, by the time the “dust of 9/11 settled, bipartisanship had vanished.”85  By the fifth anniversary of the attacks, 
“the two political parties couldn’t be farther apart.”86 
The implications for U.S. democracy are grave. Although in some ways September 11 represents an 
excellent success story and example (fitting within Kingdon’s framework), it is also an extraordinary example, and 
is difficult to imagine another event of similar magnitude. One wonders, given the extraordinary partisanship of the 
current U.S. political environment, if an event like September 11 reset the bar by which a crisis is judged. In less 
than a year following the event, Congress had already returned to its “cantankerous” nature, with thin margins of 
power, finding it “harder to reach bipartisan accord on anything.”87 
Turning to mass shootings as focusing events, this paper will examine if events, such as these, have seen 
similar success as catalysts for bipartisan cooperation and policy change. Or has there been a fundamental shift in 
the policy making process in the hyperpartisan post-9/11 world? 
Public Problem: Mass Shootings and Gun Control 
 Since the start of the 21st century, a new phenomenon has emerged that weighs heavily on the American 
conscience—mass shootings. These shootings have become an increasingly frequent and unrelenting mainstay of 
American life.88 89  The shootings are not necessarily terrorism in the conventional sense (i.e. perpetrated by 
individuals inspired or directed by a foreign terrorist organization, as in the case of 9/11), but they certainly inspire 
terror in those are who are targeted and the American people in general. However, unlike with terror attacks, clear 
motives are often absent, leaving those left behind to wonder why and how, in the absence of a clear understanding, 
these incidents could be prevented.  
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 Mass shootings are defined as attacks in which more than four people are killed and in reality, mass 
shootings account for a very small percentage of people who are killed by gun violence in the United States.90 
However, as was previously suggested, a single incident of violence (for which the motive is clearly understood 
(i.e., gang violence, domestic violence, suicide by gun, accidental deaths, violence occurs during the commission of 
other crimes (robbery))) is not enough to inspire a focusing event nor ignite a national discussion. One could 
imagine that at some point the cumulative review of all the individual deaths by guns might elevate the public's 
perception of the problem (since the year 2000, approximately 30,000 people are killed by guns in the U.S. every 
year91) and arguably it has.  
` A 2018 Gallup survey, following mass shootings in Parkland, Florida, and Las Vegas, Nevada, revealed 
that guns now rank second as the most important problem in the country, falling behind only (and perhaps notably) 
dissatisfaction with the government.92 Additionally, support for stricter gun laws is the highest it has been since 
1993 and although, on the whole, Democrats are far more likely than Republicans to support gun control, both 
parties have seen increases in support for stricter gun laws.93 
The public's preferences for action are clear -- more Americans are calling for stricter gun laws than 
at any point in the last 25 years. Concerns about gun laws, as measured by the percentage wanting 
stricter laws and the percentage mentioning it as the most important problem facing the country, 
now exceed the levels seen after the Columbine and Sandy Hook school shootings.94 
 
Despite all of these factors and an ever growing, tragic, list of mass shootings, little has been achieved on 
the public policy front. Also, despite respective increases in support, gun regulation still represents an issue for 
which there is stark partisan division95 and little policy momentum, with more than 100 attempts at federal reform 
failing (including those written by authors from both parties).96 
It is worth briefly noting that in less partisan years past, Congress was able to pass an assault weapons ban. 
The 1994 assault weapons ban “illustrates just how perfectly the legislative stars must align for contentious gun 
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measures to become law. It also shows what such an effort entails — true bipartisanship, a committed White House, 
a readiness on all sides to compromise and a willingness by some lawmakers to take a significant political risk.”97 
However, this effort did not come without significant cost,  “[t]he consequences of the vote were so severe — 
Democrats lost the House after four decades of control, with the assault weapons ban ranking high among the 
reasons — that Congress has been unable to advance major gun safety legislation since.”98 The rash of mass 
shootings in recent history appear to have opened the door again to political reform, with members of both parties 
willing to tackle the issue in response to growing demand and even in the face of significant political risk. Despite 
this willingness, even some more modest reforms (with public support), such as those to background checks, have 
met obstacles and opposition. In contrast to the sentiment of 1994 and in a show of partisan loyalty, Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell has stated he would only put on the floor "a measure the president supports.”99  
 Kingdon argues that the public policy process is dependent on a complex coming together of multiple 
factors and circumstances (streams) at the most opportune time. When this happens, a window of opportunity opens, 
and policy change can be implemented. This paper argues that in the case of gun control regulation, all of the 
necessary circumstances are present, yet, no progress has been made. By looking at several examples through the 
lens of Kingdon’s theory, perhaps a pattern will emerge suggesting an explanation for why Congress has been 
unable to fulfil its most sacred and important duty. 
Sandy Hook Elementary School: Newtown, CT 
On December 14, 2004, a 20-year-old man (Adam Lanza) shot and killed his mother at their home. Lanza, 
armed with three guns from the residence, then proceeded to the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, 
Connecticut where he forced entry and killed 26 people— 20 young children and six adults.100 Little is known about 
Lanza’s motive.  
Of course, Sandy Hook was not the first, the last, or most deadly mass shooting in U.S. history. However, 
in regard to crises as focusing events, it is difficult to imagine an event that is more tragic, image more shocking and 
frightening, or better catalyst for action than a mass shooting occurring at an elementary school, the victims’ 
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classrooms full of kindergarteners and first graders. After the shooting at Sandy Hook, the public response was 
predictably visceral.  
The shooting at Sandy Hook also occurred months after another mass shooting at a movie theater in 
Aurora, Colorado during which 12 people were killed and 70 injured.101 Thus, the topic of mass shootings (and gun 
control) were already fresh in the minds of the American people when the shooting occurred at Sandy Hook. A 
study conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism of the online conversation about 
Newtown found far more discussion of gun policy on Twitter and blogs conducted following Sandy Hook than after 
the 2011 Tucson shooting targeting U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords, confirming the salience of the issue, 
“[i]n the social media conversation, calls for stricter gun control measures exceed[ed] defenses of current gun laws 
by more than two-to-one” (After Newtown 2012). As a focusing event and in the context of the problem stream, it is 
clear that the events at Sandy Hook elevated the topic to the governmental agenda and, with bipartisan support at 
nearly every level, a window of opportunity was opened. 
In fact, in 2013, two bills were introduced in response to Sandy Hook: The Manchin-Toomey Bill (an 
amendment to the Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act of 2013) and the Assault Weapons Ban.102 The Manchin-
Toomey Bill, which proposed changes to the background check process for the purchasing of a firearm was co-
authored by a Republican and Democrat. The Assault Weapons Ban was largely an effort by Democrats but did have 
the support of one Republican Senator. Both bills ultimately failed.103  
In the case of Sandy Hook, the shooting should have been a focusing event that gave the topic of gun 
control a prominent place on the governmental agenda, as an issue clearly defined as a public problem. Following 
Sandy Hook, efforts were made to introduce legislation and bipartisan policy alternatives were presented. There was 
also a political environment which should have been conducive to the passage of the bills (i.e. Democratic Senate, 
Democratic President, national mood). So why was Congress unable to capitalize on these conditions? There appear 
to be prominent three trends.  
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First, the political environment in 2012 was partisan and polarized and gun control was an issue clearly 
divided on party lines.104 Gun control represents one of the most partisan issues facing the American public, each 
poll examined showing a clear preference within each party for gun control (Democrats) and gun rights 
(Republicans). This fact makes compromise and cooperation at the Congressional level difficult as the issue is seen 
as representing a core value of each politician’s base, in quite the same way abortion divides (and conversely, 
terrorism does not).  
Second, the margins of power were relatively thin between Republicans and Democrats in the 113th 
Congress (Senate: D- 53, R-45; House: D-200, R-233).105  Presumably, in a Congress in which the ruling party 
maintains control by only the slimmest of margins, appearing to concede, compromise, or acquiesce to the other 
party on an issue so clearly divided by the party bases, could be seen as political suicide. With an election cycle 
always on the near horizon, politicians in this environment may think more about self-preservation and the next 
election cycle than the issue at hand. 
Third, there was an extremely powerful lobby (NRA) which actively sought to kill the bills and any/all gun 
control efforts.106 The NRA is an extremely powerful voice in the gun control / gun rights debate and spends 
millions of dollars and thousands of man hours to ensure that no ground is lost in the fight to preserve gun rights, 
much of which is directed at ensuring their agendas are promoted at the Congressional level.107 
It seems clear that based on Kingdon’s theory of the policy process, all the necessary conditions to open a 
policy window were present. Additionally, it seems clear that a window did indeed open. However, as predicted by 
Kingdon, the window that opened, not capitalized on, closed nearly as quickly. In the case of Sandy Hook, it seems 
apparent that rather than whether a window was present, a better question is how hyperpartisanship, in conjunction 
with other (aforementioned) factors, exacerbated or contributed to legislative impotency. 
In the intervening years, there would be numerous other examples of mass shootings in the same vein as the 
Newtown shooting (numerous casualties, victims seemingly chosen at random, unknown or incomplete 
understanding of motives, etc.). As examples, some of the more well-known shootings include: the 2016 Pulse 
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Nightclub shooting (49 killed, 53 injured), the 2015 Inland Regional Center shooting (14 killed, 21 injured), the 
2017 Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport shooting (5 dead, 6 injured), the 2018 Marjory Stoneman 
Douglas High School shooting (17 killed, 17 injured), the 2017 First Baptist Church shooting (26 dead, 20 injured), 
the 2018 Sante Fe High School Shooting (10 dead, 10 injured), and most recently the 2018 Borderline Bar and Grill 
shooting (12 killed, 11 injured).108 One could imagine the power each one of these incidents could (and perhaps 
should) have to incite public ire aimed at demanding policy action on the issue of gun control to attempt to prevent 
or at least reduce the deadliness of these attacks.  
However, in recent history, no mass shooting was more deadly or less understood than the Route 91 
Harvest Festival shooting in Las Vegas.  
Route 91 Harvest Festival: Las Vegas, NV 
On October 1, 2017, from a suite on the 32nd floor at a high-rise hotel in Las Vegas, Stephen Paddock fired 
thousands of rounds into a crowd of thousands of people who had gathered at the Route 91 Harvest Festival. At the 
end, 58 people were killed and over 800 injured (422 from gunfire).109110 This would become the single deadliest 
mass shooting in U.S. history. Again, no clear motive for Paddock’s actions was ever uncovered. 
In the days following the Route 91 Harvest Festival shooting, a poll showed that most voters supported 
stricter gun control laws. Regarding specific proposals, “including background checks, restrictions on where 
Americans can carry firearms and prohibitions against accessories like the “bump fire” stocks used by the Las Vegas 
gunman — large majorities express[ed] support in the poll.”111 
In response, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Ca) and Representative Carlos Curbelo (R-Fla.) introduced bills 
aimed at banning bump stocks, a firearm accessory employed by Paddock that in part made his attack so deadly, so 
quickly. The bills gained bipartisan support, “with Congress members on both sides of the aisle promising 
change.”112 However, following intervention by the NRA, the bills stalled.   
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Like Sandy Hook, all conditions were necessary for the window of opportunity to open and for Congress to 
pursue policy change on an issue that was of utmost concern to the electorate. Mass shootings clearly represented a 
public problem to voters and the Route 91 Harvest Festival shooting placed the issue of gun control again front and 
center on the minds of Americans and on the government’s agenda. Policy alternatives were proposed by way of the 
Automatic Gunfire Prevention Act, which, from the political side, enjoyed bipartisan support. 
However, also like Sandy Hook, the circumstances and events following the Route 91 shooting revealed 
similar trends. First, despite growing public and bipartisan support for gun control, gun control remained an 
extremely polarizing and partisan issue. Second, the 115th Congress saw power distributed by more of less the same 
margins (although with shifts in control).113 And third, the NRA again voiced their opposition, which had an 
immediate chilling effect on bipartisan efforts, “calling for a regulatory assessment of bump stocks as opposed to a 
legislative one.”114  
A fourth factor was also raised by Senator Chris Murphy. Murphy, a Connecticut Democrat and strong 
proponent of increased gun control, stated "it's difficult with a 24-hour news cycle to keep attention on the policy 
solutions in the aftermath of these murders."115 Adding that “what it boils down to is a lack of regular order and an 
ability to work in a bipartisan fashion in Congress, which prevents anything from even having a debate.”116 
The Route 91 Festival represents another mass shooting example in the vein of Sandy Hook: a focusing 
event which was successful, as prescribed by Kingdon, in opening a wide and sufficiently persistent policy window. 
However, no legislation was successfully enacted at the federal level as a result. The reasons why appear to be 
increasingly complex and multifaceted, each factor compounding on the other. However, in the case of Route 91, 
there remained low-risk, widely supported measures that Congress could have pursued, but did not. Allowing, to the 
growing frustration of the electorate, the window of opportunity to close on the issue of gun control once again. That 
is, until the next mass shooting. 
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School: Parkland, Florida  
A mere 4 months following the shooting at the Route 91 Harvest Festival, one of the most recent, and 
troubling, mass shootings occurred at the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. 
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Representing a frightening sub-set of mass shootings (school shootings), the Parkland shooting also carries the 
unfortunate status as the deadliest high school shooting in U.S. history, with 17 killed and 14 additional wounded.117 
Amongst the dead were teachers and high school students, some as young as 14 years old, gunned down on 
Valentine’s Day 2018 by a 19 year old former student, Nikolas Cruz, using an AR-15 he had purchased legally a 
year prior.118 119  
In many ways, Parkland echoed the familiar themes and trends following the shootings that came before. 
Immediately following the attack, there was a significant and observable shift in support for gun control, with 
support for stricter gun laws spiking in polls conducted after the fatal South Florida school shooting. “Hitting its 
highest level in at least a quarter-century” immediately following the Parkland shooting, stricter gun control laws 
were supported by roughly 2 in 3 registered voters (68 percent), compared with just 25 percent who opposed stricter 
gun laws.120 Parkland demonstrated a significant shift in the mood of the nation:  
Americans who want more restrictive gun laws is greater now than after any other recent shooting...support 
for stricter gun laws was at 58 percent following the 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting that killed 49 people, 64 
percent following the 2017 mass shooting that resulted in 58 deaths at a country-music festival in Las 
Vegas and 60 percent last November, after a shooter killed 26 people inside a church in Sutherland Springs, 
Texas.121  
 
The polls also showed a marked increase in support from Republicans, who are generally predisposed to 
oppose stricter gun control, accordingly “‘53 percent of Republicans indicated they supported stricter gun laws, 
compared to 37 percent [of Republicans] who said the same following the Pulse nightclub shooting in June 
2016’.”122 
Further, polling showed most gun control proposals such as background checks, raising age limits, national 
database tracking, waiting periods, and banning bump stocks, all enjoyed support by an overwhelming majority (in 
many cases 80+%). Despite this near consensus, these measures continued to be opposed by a large share of 
Republicans in Congress.123 
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However, although gun control has seen a steady increase in support since the time of Sandy Hook, the 
immediate and substantial rush that followed Parkland appeared to have dissipated within months. By May 2018, 
“69 percent of American adults supported strong or moderate regulations or restrictions for firearms, down from 75 
percent in late March.”124 It is worth noting here that this trend perhaps belies a bigger trend in American media 
consumption, which is the relatively short shelf life of any given crisis in the age of the 24-hour news cycle and 
social media. In conjunction with partisanship at the federal level, the inability of any crisis to hold the national 
attention for long also implies significant consequences to the health of U.S. democracy, given the speed at which 
the bureaucratic wheels turn. 
In the case of the Parkland shooting, the NRA remained an active and powerful foe. In the month following 
the shooting, it appeared that the pro-gun control activism following the shooting may have “deepened the resolve of 
its supporters.”125 In March, the NRA Political Victory Fund raised $2.35 million “the highest monthly amount 
raised for the fund in records dating back to 2003.”126  
Legislative attempts at the federal level also continued to stall following the Parkland shooting, despite 
national pressure. 127 128 However, Parkland inspired a rush of legislative wins at the state level, which may herald a 
new way forward as Congress remains ineffective at transforming public pressure and opinion into policy.129 130 
Following Parkland, “[g]un-control advocates had their best year in state legislatures in recent history.”131  
Since the Florida shooting, the Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence counts 55 new gun-control 
laws passing in 26 states. That is far more success than they normally see, any way you measure it: in the 
number of laws, the variety of the laws passed and the bipartisan support a number of them had. 
Republican governors in 15 states signed bills gun-control advocates supported.132 
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 Leading the movement of public pressure was a group of student survivors from the Parkland shooting who 
thus far brought about unrivaled success for the gun-control movement in the United States, 50+ new state laws 
restricting access to guns, ranging from banning bump stocks to allowing authorities to temporarily disarm 
potentially violent people.133  
The Parkland shooting may also herald yet another change that could pull the reality of gun control 
legislation closer yet, the downfall of the NRA. According to polls conducted prior to the U.S. 2018 midterm 
elections, the NRA may have suffered lasting and irreversible damage following the Parkland shooting. Inspired by 
the student protesters, corporate partners of the NRA began to cut ties, “[h]otel chains, car rental firms and home 
insurance businesses had offered discounts to members of the NRA but cancelled them in droves after the 
shooting.”134 Although every mass shooting usually brings about a dip in the popularity of the NRA, the 
organization has been able to rebound via lobbying in the past. This power appears to have weakened following 
Parkland, with indications that the organization is “‘now underwater and shows no signs of bouncing back.’” 135  
 Whether or not the progress the Parkland shooting has inspired truly heralds a new way forward remains to 
be seen. Ultimately, even following the tragedy at Parkland, familiar themes persist: Congress suffers thin margins 
of power, hyperpartisanship, and deadlock; the NRA continued to aggressively lobby against gun control measures; 
gun control remained a primarily partisan and divisive issue; and the 24-hour news cycle showed its power to both 
help and hurt a cause through its style of coverage. As of the writing of this paper, gun control after Parkland suffers 
the same fate as all the others at the federal and Congressional level. And although a frustration, it is not a surprise 
to American voters. Although 7 in 10 favor stricter gun control measures, 51 percent expected elected officials to 
tighten gun laws, while 42 percent expected no changes.136 
 Congress was provided yet another opportunity following Parkland to initiate and actualize meaningful 
change on the matter of gun control, a window of opportunity that was perhaps the most conducive to policy change 
yet. And still, efforts failed, stalled, or were neglected to be raised at all.  
Policy Windows in the Wake of Mass Shootings 
                                               
133 Matt Vasilogambros, "After Parkland, States Pass 50 New Gun-Control Laws,” pewtrusts.org, August 2, 2018, 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/08/02/after-parkland-states-pass-50-new-gun-control-laws.  
134 Amanda Holpuch, “Six victories for the gun control movement since the Parkland massacre,” The Guardian, March 26, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/mar/26/gun-control-movement-march-for-our-lives-stoneman-douglas-parkland-builds-momentum.  
135 John Bonazzo, “NRA Slipping With Voters, Though Many Have Moved on From Gun Control,”  The Observer, September 10, 2018, 
https://observer.com/2018/09/nra-gun-control-polling-parkland/.  





In the case of mass shootings, it appears clear that the issue is not, as previously assumed, that the events 
are not significant or serious enough to be elevated to the government’s agenda. In the examples given above, the 
conditions prescribed by Kingdon were met: the public expressed their concern, the political conditions were right, 
and policy alternatives were offered. Mass shootings were defined by the public as crises, clearly of large enough 
scale and not within the “pre-window” phase as described by other studies. Congress also enjoyed a strong feedback 
loop, most notably the March for Our Lives, a nationwide protest following the Parkland shooting.137 It also seems 
that the question is not whether the events were significant enough to open the windows, the windows were opened 
wide. Rather the question is why did Congress continuously fail to capitalize on the opportunities that were available 
and for which they appeared to have strong positive inclinations toward? In the case of the mass shootings profiled 
above, several common trends emerged, most of which are related to partisanship.  
First, the issue remained, at each juncture, highly polarized and partisan (e.g., gun control is largely 
supported by Democrats, gun rights are largely supported by Republicans). Although over time and with each 
additional shooting, the number of people from both parties supporting gun control, in general, increased, the 
margins of support (at all levels) remained thin.  
Second, the margins of power in Congress have been relatively thin over the last two decades. Thin 
margins of power may mean that the perception of a legislator’s risk (i.e. reelection) to bargaining or compromising 
with the other side is higher, this may dissuade legislators from compromising on issues that are controversial or 
generally polarized to begin with and during a period of extreme partisanship. According to Frances Lee, these thin 
margins and highly competitive reelection campaigns further contribute to the intractability of the current 
environment and the inability to find common ground on issues with bipartisan support, “toxic partisanship is in 
great part fueled by close competition for power, not just different opinions over the role and scope of 
government.”138 
Third, in the case of gun control, there was a highly influential and powerful lobby intervening at every 
policy attempt, the NRA. To Kingdon’s point regarding participants, interest groups (lobbies) can represent an 
incredibly persuasive factor in the policy process and in the case of gun control, they certainly did. Many legislators 
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are beholden to these groups who represent the opinions of many of their constituents, a source of financial support, 
and the perception of their likely success at the next election. Additionally, coinciding with the increased 
polarization and partisanship, the NRA itself has become inherently political and partisan. Beginning in 1994, 
following the assault weapons ban, the NRA has continuously aligned itself closer to the Republican party. Despite 
having bipartisan origins, by 2016, the NRA was essentially a Republican organization, with 99% of its campaign 
contributions going to party candidates.139 
The question remains, with a number of other factors at play, how much does the hyperpartisan 
environment really matter? Ultimately, the author believes that hyperpartisanship (while not the only factor) plays a 
large role in Congress’ inability to arrive at compromise. Per Kingdon’s theory, all the necessary conditions were 
met in the examples given, in order for the windows of opportunity to open. September 11, therefore, did not 
represent a watershed moment in the sense that it raised the bar on how extreme or catastrophic an event must be in 
order to open the proverbial window. As evidenced, many mass shootings over the last two decades opened these 
windows.  
Rather, September 11 appears to represent the conditions necessary to allow Congress to capitalize on the 
open window during a time of extreme polarization and partisanship. September 11, 2001 was not a day otherwise 
unburdened by polarizing and partisan forces in D.C., and as was noted, shortly after the dust from the attacks 
settled, Congress set right back into their partisan ways. In contrast to the mass shootings profiled, September 11 
represented an event with such extreme loss, it was impossible to not respond. In the aftermath of September 11, one 
could regard each legislator’s bipartisan efforts as themselves efforts in self-preservation. As a public problem, 
terrorism is also uncontroversial, no legislator is “pro”-terrorism.   
In the case of mass shootings, the Route 91 Harvest Festival shooting was the closest in scale, but still 
unsuccessful in inspiring cooperation. The policy alternatives presented following the Route 91 shooting were both 
workable and enjoyed bipartisan support (the ban of bump stocks). However, arguably, by 2017 the hyperpartisan 
environment during the Trump administration, which casts Democrats and Republicans as virtual enemies, more or 
less guaranteed that legislators would be unwilling to risk cooperating with the opposing side. Additionally, the 
event, arguably, did not reach the perceived scale to necessitate response. Polls demonstrated time and again that 
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there are certain gun control measures that receive much higher levels of support and are much less controversial 
than others (background checks, banning bump stocks, etc.), no matter one’s party. It is in regard to these particular 
measures, which do enjoy bipartisan support, that hyperpartisanship likely played a role.  In this environment, 
bargaining and compromising is seen as risky. In years prior, it was expected that legislators would work together, 
compromise, and cross the aisle when necessary to move the policy agenda forward. Only in an environment which 
is so polarized and negatively charged is such action deemed risky or detrimental to one’s political career.  
A Contemporary Success Story? 
As an aside, as this paper was being written, a highly unusual and promising effort was unrolling at the 
congressional level. Just prior to the midterm elections in November 2018, Congress emphatically proved it still had 
the capacity to come together, compromise and find solutions to controversial issues in response to public demand 
and in order to stave off a national crisis: the opioid crisis. 
Since the early 1990s, the number of prescribed opioid painkillers has steadily increased, from 112 million 
in 1992 to a peak of 282 million in 2012.140 Concurrently, as a result of the complex legal history of pharmaceutical 
pain management, including the scheduling of certain drugs and the aggressive marketing of others, an addiction 
crisis developed in the United States.141 Subsequently, many individuals who became addicted to prescribed pain 
medication (the addictive nature of which was mis/underrepresented) ultimately turned to less expensive and more 
accessible options, such as heroin. As a result, from 2002 to 2016, the number of heroin overdose deaths increased 
533%. In 2017 alone, nearly 50,000 people died in the U.S. from an overdose that included the use of opioids.142 On 
October 26, 2017, President Trump officially declared the opioid crisis a national Public Health Emergency under 
federal law.143 Following this declaration, Congress responded. 
In what represented a rare bipartisan effort, both the Senate and the House of Representatives 
overwhelmingly approved the “SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act,” a bill intended to “address a national 
health crisis that has devastated communities all over the country.”144 By October 24, 2018, approximately a year to 
the day from his declaration, President Trump signed the bill into law.145  
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Although the nature of the crises is different, the opioid crisis resembles the mass shooting/gun control 
issue in many relevant and important ways. Although the opioid crisis represents hundreds of thousands of deaths, 
the victims each stand alone. There was no one, large scale, unavoidable, or high-profile focusing event that elevated 
the crisis to the governmental agenda. Also similar to the issue of mass shootings/gun control, historically the issue 
of how to handle drugs and addiction is also a partisan issue (stronger enforcement vs. 
decriminalization/legalization.)146 147 The opioid crisis also faced a strong opposing lobby in the pharmaceutical 
industry.148 And yet, Congress was able to overcome these factors to push through legislation to respond to the issue 
which had become a national crisis, “the sweeping bipartisan support for the opioids package was a reminder that 
Congress can still find ways to work together on pressing issues.” 149 
The opioid crisis and the resultant legislation bears mentioning as it represents another public problem that 
was elevated to the government agenda, and per Kingdon, a window of opportunity to act presented itself and 
Congress successfully responded. Although this paper will not dive deep into a comparative analysis, it seemed 
worthwhile to acknowledge this recent success story, in the context of a broader frustration with a hyperpartisan 
Congress and its’ ineffectiveness. Perhaps there are lessons and strategies that can be taken from the opioid crisis 
that can be applied to other issues of national importance which have struggled to find similar success at the 
legislative level.  
CONCLUSIONS: 
 In closing, with the exception of few and limited examples, there does appear to be a problem of some 
significance at the Congressional level.  More specifically, in the context of Kingdon’s theory on public policy, 
Congress appears to generally be incapable of capitalizing on policy windows. This phenomenon has left Congress 
largely unresponsive to many public demands and problems over the last two decades, to include the issue of gun 
control. 
An examination of the issue through the lens of mass shootings as focusing events reveals that the issue is 
about more than just partisanship, polarization, and rhetoric. However, in the case of mass shootings and gun 
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control, the hyperpartisanship that has emerged over the last 20 years appears to be the factor that makes it 
impossible to overcome the others (e.g., such as strong opposing lobbies, thin margins of power, concerns about 
self-preservation, the 24-hour news cycle, and the polarized nature of the issue itself). 
The potential significance to the health of the U.S. democratic system is obvious, Congress should be the 
institution most representative and responsive to the American public. If it has become ineffective, unresponsive, 
and deadlocked, it has become unable to perform its most essential and sacred duty. This begs the question, what 
can be done? 
Perhaps a deeper look at the circumstances surrounding the legislative response to the opioid crisis would 
provide insight. Or perhaps the cooperation and results that emerged from this issue will herald a new way forward. 
Perhaps a reframing of the mass shooting crisis, in similar ways to how the opioid crisis was framed, would make 
the issue more palatable and less controversial for legislative action. 
Perhaps a more party-diverse Congress would ease the perceived personal and professional costs associated 
to Democrats and Republicans engaging in across the aisle compromise. Perhaps a more parliamentary style of 
government, ranked choice voting, or term limits could provide ways for more moderate politicians, third parties and 
independent candidates to break the traditionally bipartisan hold the Democrats and Republicans maintain.150  
Perhaps removing money from politics and reducing the influence, power, and effectiveness of professional 
lobbies would allow politicians to approach issues based on merit and public need rather than out of concern for 
self-preservation and financing. Perhaps corporate America will continue to play a stronger role in expressing the 
public need and forcing action by hitting lobbies where it hurts the most (financially). 
Perhaps a different media strategy would promote a better understanding of the issues, allowing consumers 
to fully absorb information and process it through a broader lens. A media that is less focused on the 
sensationalization of issues and quantity over quality might increase the longevity of issues both on the national 
consciousness as well as on the government’s agenda.  
Finally, perhaps, the inaction at the federal legislative level will continue a trend observed following the 
Parkland shooting; states intervening and enacting law in instances when Congress appears unable. This may signal 
a new and more tenable trend in U.S. democracy, one in which federal law takes a back seat to state legislation.  
                                               





Ultimately, the health of the American democratic experiment depends on the continued relationship 
between the people and the government. The partisan and polarizing nature of the current American political climate 
has not just made for a weary public but evidently for an ineffectual Congress. In a government of the people, by the 
people, for the people, when the people demand, the government must respond. If Congress no longer serves the 






The Immigration Impasse: Unique Solutions for Partisan Problems 




 American federalism is a unique and rare blend, it “conveys something of our high re­gard for regional, 
local, and indi­vidual diversity, widely varied yet capable of achieving a simultane­ous national unity.”151  A 
supreme federal government providing centralized organization and ensuring the provision of citizens most basic 
rights stands in juxtaposition and harmony to individual semi-sovereign states. This system designed to endow all of 
the benefits and securities of a centralized authority with all the diversity and liberty of a more localized and 
parochial representative. 
Since the turn of the century and more relevantly, since the 2016 election, the American political system 
has faced new and unprecedented challenges. The election of Donald Trump in 2016 demonstrated a partisan 
atmosphere and domestic divisions unlike ever before.152  
As the American public has grown increasingly frustrated with lawmakers in Washington D.C.153, a 
spotlight has been cast on numerous issues for which the American public appears anxious to see a public policy 
response, but Congress has been unable, or unwilling, to find a bipartisan policy solution.  
Chapter one, utilizing mass shootings as focusing events, examined whether or not a hyperpartisan 
environment is responsible for the lack of a meaningful and effective response from Congress and whether or not 
hyperpartisanship has also fundamentally shifted the conditions previously believed to be required for the 
mechanisms of the U.S.’ democratic policy machine to engage.  
Ultimately, the conclusions of chapter one were not nearly as straightforward as anticipated but in the case 
of mass shootings, and in particular the Parkland shooting, an encouraging and promising trend emerged. The 
inaction at the federal legislative level inspired states to intervene and enact laws in instances when Congress 
remained unwilling and unable. Does this signal a new and more tenable trend in U.S. democracy, one in which 
federal law takes a back seat to state legislation? 
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Traditionally certain issues and rights have been reserved for the federal government. However, as was 
identified in chapter one, states were effectively able to legislate more restrictive gun control measures following 
several mass shootings, when Congress was not. Gun control is an issue firmly rooted in a discussion of 
constitutional rights, more specifically the Second Amendment and thus would be an issue expected to be dealt with 
at the federal level. However, in the face of an ineffectual and paralyzingly polarized Congress, is a possible and 
viable alternative for states to localize and legislate traditionally federal issues? Or are some issues simply too big, 
too broad, and too consequential to be delegated? 
With the ideas of liberty and freedom from persecution at the core of her national identity, the United States 
is a country founded by and for immigrants. Immigration is an issue which has traditionally, and perhaps rightfully, 
been within the purview of the federal government and has become one of the most divisive and highest priority 
issues facing Congress, and the administration.154 Controversy over immigration policy is not itself new, nor is its’ 
place on the list of priorities. However, American’s exasperation at Congress’ inability to fix a broken system may 
be. 
Congress has, in less partisan times, also been able to find common ground on immigration reform. Both 
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) as well as a series of reforms in the 1990s (to include the 
Immigration Act and the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)) proved that 
Congress was capable of coming together on the controversial issue.155 Each of these efforts displayed significant 
support from both parties. In the case of the IIRIRA, the House passed the legislation with the support of 76 
democrats156 – a significant portion willing to engage in the bipartisan effort. In the Senate, the IIRIRA passed with 
near unanimous support, only 3 democrats dissenting.157 However, since 2000, continued efforts at reforming 
immigration, even those with bipartisan support and promise, have stalled. 
By examining the foundations of American federalism and division of power between state and federal, 
historical precedents for adoption of national issues on the state level, and utilizing immigration as a test case, this 
paper proposes that in the face of a hyperpartisan Washington D.C. in perpetual policy deadlock, states will be 
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challenged to creatively endeavor to take on policy projects far beyond their envisioned scope. Are these efforts, 
which must contend with national policy and competing state policies, doomed to fail? Is this effort contrary to the 
very core of American federalism? Or will enterprising states effectively bridge the gap, bringing much needed 
policy relief to a desperate public. 
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
 Previous scholarship has provided a framework that provides context to the issue, including the historical 
legacy of the federal and state dichotomy, the concept of preemption, and the legacy of the immigration issue as a 
national priority, all within the context of the hyperpartisan political environment. 
Immigration as a Federal Issue: Federal Foundations 
The tension between the federal government and state governments is an enduring and important feature of 
the American federal system. As the Founding Founders argued for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, James 
Madison wrote, “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and 
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”158  
The federal system was designed to thwart tyranny and the state, and its’ relative power, was an important 
mechanism in this effort. However, the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution which describes the enumeration of 
powers is perhaps a bit nebulous, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”159 As events unfolded in the years that 
followed, debates raged on as the federal government increasingly usurped jurisdiction over issue after issue.  
According to some, the period following the mid-1960s marked a time of “revolutionary changes in the 
American federal system” which made the system “considerably more malleable” and “raised important questions 
about the future role of states.”160 During this period, an explosion of preemptive statutes based on Congress’ 
delegated and implied powers fundamentally (at least for the time) shifted the perception of the nation-state 
relationship.161  
 In the latter part of the twentieth century, the number of federal preemptive statutes burgeoned further, 
raising questions about the future role of the state and the dynamic between the two planes of government. However, 
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this increase also grew out of a recognition that many problems have interstate implications that are not easily 
solved at the state level. This increase in federal preemptive statutes led to a “modified” and more dynamic theory of 
federalism.162 In a system that is dependent on checks and balances and respect for state sovereignty, some see the 
doctrine of preemption as an enormous threat. With few incentives in place, Congress is free to preempt state law, 
“even when the state interests Congress displaces far exceed its own.”163  
In a traditional structural preemption view of immigration authority, it is understood that the national 
government has been endowed jurisdiction over immigration directly from the Constitution.164 However, in regards 
to the jurisdictional boundaries which have practically encompassed immigration, it turns out the story is more 
complicated than expected and presents a topic up for considerable debate.165  
Immigration as a Federal Issue: Supremacy and Preemption Prevail  
Much has been said by contemporary scholars on the topic of immigration authority. For some, 
jurisdictional authority has been cemented in the favor of the national government. Those in support of federal 
ownership of the regulation of immigration point broadly to the Constitution, enumerated powers, the presumption 
of preemption and the supremacy of federal law. Scholars in the pro-federal camp also point to the practicality of a 
national policy to address an issue that crosses state and international boundaries and has foreign policy 
implications. Constitutionally based arguments are lacking in specificity as the Constitution does not address 
immigration directly or at great length. Historical arguments must also contend with the legacy of state and local 
purview of immigration.  
Prior to the Civil War, immigration was very much a state and local matter, with five broad categories of 
immigration policy living at the state level, including regulation of public health, movement of the poor and 
criminals, slavery and racial subordination.166 Contemporary critics minimize the importance of historical state 
immigration legislation relying on two general arguments, the legislation was ineffective and unconstitutional, 
supporting the current doctrine that regulation of immigration is an “exclusive power of the federal government.”167 
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Following the abolishment of slavery and passage of the 14th Amendment, the tides began to turn and reflect this 
broader belief, “the states were by judicial action soon ousted from immigration lawmaking, at least with respect to 
core decisions regarding the admission and exclusion of aliens.”168  
The jurisdictional place of immigration, was even more firmly cemented in the late 1800s when the 
Supreme Court, via their decision in Chae Chan Ping  v. United States, established, through structural reasoning, 
that despite not having explicitly enumerated powers in the constitution, the federal government has the authority to 
regulate migration. 169 Although often the subject of controversy, it is argued by some that this decision was based 
on “the close linkage between foreign affairs and immigration control decisions,”170 rather than an automatic 
deference to the federal government and its branches. This decision is considered the source of the plenary power 
from which the federal government (Congress) derives its absolute authority on immigration. According to Peter 
Schuck in his 2007 article, “Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously”, despite many academic arguments to the 
contrary, it’s likely that  “no principle in immigration law is more firmly established, or of greater antiquity, than the 
plenary power of the federal government to regulate immigration.”171 And arguably, the plenary power doctrine may 
continue to grow in strength as pressures from an increasingly chaotic world increase.172  
Arguments in support of the plenary power doctrine, and federal ownership of the immigration issue 
identify immigration as an issue rooted in foreign relations or foreign affairs.173 In fact, “modern immigration law is 
permeated with the assumption that regulating immigration is inherently a federal activity with close links to foreign 
relations.”174  
It is also argued that the power to “exclude or deport aliens is inherent in sovereignty, and that Congress’s 
exercise of that power is therefore immune from substantive constitutional constraints.”175 It is thus suggested that 
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Congressional power over immigration also derives from enumerated powers, albeit not explicitly, such as powers 
over commerce, naturalization, and war.176  
Although immigration enforcement and law-making were previously a nearly exclusively federal endeavor, 
over the last several decades, a devolution of federal power to local governments has unfolded. In some ways, this 
was voluntary, by design (via the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act), and inspired by 
necessity (rapidly increasing flow of illegal immigrants in the 1990s and early 2000s), focused mainly on 
enforcement.177 At this time, the federal government willingly delegated a significant amount of enforcement 
activity to the states. However, the sub-federal role has continued to expand far beyond this scope. Although a real 
and intensifying phenomenon, this expansion brought with it an intense debate about the constitutionality and 
suitability of such policies, with many contemporary scholars criticizing the movement.178 Immigration is not the 
only issue which has seen crossover, but another critical argument in favor of federal ownership focuses on specific 
features of the issue which suggest it is better managed at the national level. According to these theories, states 
should only serve as “laboratories of democracy”179 for certain issues, and immigration is not one. In order for 
experimentation to be viable at the local level, states must both internalize costs and the results must be replicable. 
According to some, both aspects are lacking in sub-federal legislation of immigration.180  
Immigration as a Federal Issue: Shared Authority as an Alternative 
In contrast, the scholarship on immigration federalism is equally as deep and broad. Over the course of the 
last two decades, a plethora of state and local laws and resolutions have emerged which have shifted the perception 
surrounding the issue. Proponents of sub-federal activity cite federal inaction, economic models, and recent legal 
decisions as supporting the argument that state and local governments can and should become major players in the 
immigration regulation game. 
Immigration federalism is broadly defined as the role sub-federal governments (state and local) play in 
making and implementing immigration law and policy.181 The recent increase in the salience of immigration 
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federalism and flurry of sub-federal activity is seen as one of the most important developments in immigration 
regulation.182  
“To those who view immigration policy as solely within the province of the federal government, state and 
local involvement seems anathema”183 but recent history has normalized this approach. Since the turn of the century, 
Congress has remained incapable of passing comprehensive reform despite several (failed) attempts.184 In response, 
there has been a marked change, with sub- federal governments making a significant foray into immigration law and 
legislation.185 According to some, this shift, in which states are emerging as “major players in immigration law- and 
policy making” eschews a “century of judicially protected exclusive federal authority.”186  
“The conventional explanation for the recent spate of state and local laws should be familiar to anyone 
paying attention to immigration policy. It holds that policy stalemate at the federal level, combined with the pressure 
created by the public policy challenges of recent and rapid demographic changes, compel states and localities to 
legislate in a field they have no choice but to enter.”187  
 
Building on this, state and local authorities themselves offer two explanations. First and most importantly, 
they cite “recent federal legislative inaction on immigration” which has created  “a policy vacuum that invites sub-
federal participation.”188 These arguments are centrally focused on a “policy” or “legislative void” which has been 
pervasive since approximately the mid 1990s, after which point all Congressional efforts have met their demise. 
These jurisdictions also claim that the negative consequences of the “legislative void”189, including economic 
depression and overcrowding due to migrants, have forced state and local governments to respond. Officials and 
those who are supportive of restrictive sub-federal immigration efforts “have paired these demographic claims with 
a complaint that the federal government has forsaken its constitutional and statutory responsibility to control 
unwanted immigration.”190  
It is worth noting that this appears to be a complicated explanation. Although the “narrative of federal 
failure” may be pervasive, to some it is problematic, and in the context of this paper it is worth highlighting recent 
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findings that relate to this argument. In the 2013 article, Immigration Federalism: A Reappraisal, Gulasekaram and 
Ramakrishnan argue that “this explanation for the current era of immigration federalism is theoretically, legally, and 
descriptively flawed.”191 Gulasekaram and Ramakrishan do not argue against the suitability or legality of sub-federal 
efforts, in fact, they offer a bevy of evidence supporting state and local legislation. However, in order to understand 
the phenomena in the broader context, it is important to note that the situation at the federal level is at least more 
complicated than some of the sub-federal-level arguments suggest and a better understanding of the complexities of 
resource constraints and enforcement priorities is necessary. Gulasekaram et. al also question the legitimacy of 
arguments that focus on critical necessity and suggest they should require “empirical verification.”192 Federal 
inactivity and sub-federal activity are undoubtedly “linked and interdependent”193 but in many of these cases, 
necessity and demographic arguments fell short on facts. Ultimately, the more consistent motivation appeared to be 
“partisan opportunities and political entrepreneurship.”194 According to their analysis, which included review of over 
25,000 municipalities and all 50 states, Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram concluded that local partisanship emerged 
as the most important factor in explaining the spread of sub-federal immigration laws, noting that Republican-heavy 
areas were much more likely to pass restrictive legislation than Democrat-heavy areas.195  
Others point to the development of immigration federalism as an important display of some of federalism’s 
most important and positive features. Peter Spiro highlights the “steam valve” virtue of federalism in the context of 
immigration. Spiro’s theory invokes a more capitalist image of the process, one state’s preference (be it more 
restrictive or more permissive) can be borne out without being forced on the entire population by way of 
Washington. This allows individual states to conduct a cost-benefit analysis based on their policies. This, Spiro 
argues, may ultimately benefit the immigrant, as more restrictive policies may “provoke opprobrium”196 from 
disapproving states and hurt interstate commerce. Decentralizing the decision making in immigration policy also 
protects against extreme views at the national level, ensuring a more diverse, representative, and varied patchwork 
model of regulation and enforcement.197  
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Courts and academics have also been important champions of many sub-federal efforts to creatively 
approach particularly intractable national issues.198 Recently, Courts have further bolstered this in a series of 
decisions which have ceded more to state and local governments in the realm of immigration. 
“As a result of the spate of litigation over sub-federal immigration ordinances, the jurisprudence 
of immigration federalism in the United States is becoming more nuanced—with increasing space created 
for state and local participation in immigration regulation. Courts still generally take the position that the 
federal government has primacy in regulating immigration laws, but recent decisions have shown an 
increasing tolerance for state or local regulations that do not contravene the federal regulatory 
scheme.”199  
 
Many portended cases like Arizona v. United States  in 2011 would “signal the end of state and local 
engagement of immigration regulation.”200 On the contrary, scholars such as Stella Burch Elias argue that these 
cases simply imply a new direction for immigration federalism, with an increased emphasis on inclusionary efforts 
(as opposed to restrictive). Inclusionary sub-federal efforts have the potential to “inform, complement, and 
occasionally contradict federal efforts at comprehensive immigration reform.”201 
Immigration is also not the first, last, nor most controversial issue which has met unsatisfactory resolution 
at the federal level. The question of whether the issue of immigration could find legislative relief at the state level 
may be supported by some of these other contemporary examples. In these other examples, it has been argued that 
courts should read the preemption clause more narrowly, aspire to reconcile multiple jurisdictional interests and 
should consider information outside the letter of the law. These arguments recognize that there are occasions in 
which there should be some remedy for inaction at the federal level, and further “such a heightened deference would 
still allow Congress to preempt but would otherwise prevent laws adopted in other eras and other times from ending 
modern social experiments.”202 In the case of immigration specifically, the federal government should have a real 
interest in allowing states to play a significant role, as in many ways, the states have “an even greater stake in the 
effective administration and enforcement of immigration law than the federal government does.”203  
METHODOLOGY: Case Studies 
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In order to examine whether sub-federal legislation of traditionally federal issues presents a viable 
alternative in the context of a hyperpartisan and deadlocked Congressional environment, this paper introduces 
several case studies that should function to demonstrate whether or not there has been a fundamental change to how 
(and at what level) public policy is made.  
The following section will take a closer look at both restrictive and permissive efforts, the origins of the 
sub-federal program/legislation, the structure of the sub-federal programs/legislation, the challenges mounted 
against the effort, and the persistence and or successes of the effort. Through this examination answers to the 
following questions should emerge: Was the sub-federal program inspired by Congressional inaction? Was the sub-
federal program/law specifically designed to replace or preempt federal action? Have there been compelling 
preemption arguments contradicting the efforts? And finally, does the sub-federal effort represent a viable 
alternative? Ultimately shedding light on the larger question, do these efforts imply a larger and more consequential 
shift in U.S. democratic functions? 
Immigration as a States Rights Issue: Restrictive Efforts 
Over the last decade, there have been thousands of sub-federal laws and resolutions passed, aimed at 
further regulating immigration.204 Many of these efforts, especially in the earlier years of the past decade, were 
restrictive in nature. These efforts aimed to make it “more difficult for immigrants to reside in communities, work, 
and live their daily lives.”205  
The early part of this period of heightened restrictive effort was characterized by the omnibus bill, and 
Arizona stood at the forefront, playing a prominent role in the push to aggressively combat illegal immigration 
within its borders. Arizona’s 2010 law, Senate Bill 1070, formally named, Support [Our] Law Enforcement and Safe 
Neighborhoods Act, aimed to do what Arizona perceived the federal government had not. On the signing of the bill, 
Governor Jan Brewer stated, “we work to solve a crisis that we did not create and the federal government has 
refused to fix: the crisis caused by illegal immigration and Arizona’s porous border.”206 In arguments leading up to 
the bill’s signing, Arizona Senator Thayer Verschoor painted an even bleaker and more dire picture, "We've had an 
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abdication of our federal government's responsibility to enforce immigration laws here, protect our borders, protect 
us from the criminals that are crossing our borders, who are killing our citizens, who are robbing their homes, 
invading their homes."207  
However, although federal inaction was certainly a relevant theme on the immigration front, there appears 
to be little information of evidentiary value supporting the broad and vague references to the border crisis.   
The bill itself was in large part a mirror of federal enforcement of immigration efforts and focused largely 
on increasing state requirements, crimes and penalties aimed at reducing illegal aliens in Arizona through attrition 
and further discourage and deter future entries via the southern border. More specifically, SB 1070 prohibited local 
and municipal governments from adopting policies less restrictive than federal law, the employment of unauthorized 
aliens, the harboring of illegal aliens, the transportation of illegal aliens, and required employers to verify all 
employee status via e-verify programs, amongst other provisions. S.B. 1070 also indemnified local law enforcement 
officers in these efforts and most controversially, included the “papers, please” provision which required sub-federal 
law enforcement officers to request proof of immigration status and detain individuals based on reasonable suspicion 
and lack of substantive proof.208 These efforts both further criminalized unauthorized status and increased the pace 
and scope of enforcement efforts. 
Before S.B. 1070 was signed, it was met with immediate and substantial rebuke, both from within Arizona 
and throughout the U.S. Critics described the law as racist, unjust, and discriminatory. The law even divided law 
enforcement. Although the Fraternal Order of Police endorsed the bill, other national law enforcement organizations 
condemned the effort with concerns that it would encourage racial and ethnic profiling and discourage victim 
cooperation and reporting of crimes. The Arizona Association of Chiefs of Police called the law “burdensome and 
an intrusion into a federal matter.”209 And the federal government agreed. Before the law could take effect in July of 
2010, the U.S. Justice Department filed suit for an injunction, barring the law based on its unconstitutionality. 
According to the Justice Department, S.B. 1070 was preempted by federal law, by U.S. foreign policy, and violated 
                                               
207 Thayer Verschoor, “Quotes from the debate on SB 1070 and others on the legislation,” Arizona Daily Sun, April 20, 2010, 
https://azdailysun.com/quotes-from-the-debate-on-sb-and-others-on-the/article_b19e44b7-6484-5e60-97a5-062d3c47297b.html.  
208 “SENATE BILL 1070,” State of Arizona Senate, Forty-Ninth Legislature, Second Regular Session, (2010): 1-16,. 
https://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf.  
209 Randal C. Archibald, “Arizona’s Effort to Bolster Local Immigration Authority Divides Law Enforcement,” The New York Times, April 21, 





the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 210 211  In 2012, the Supreme Court, with 
its ultimate authority, sided generally with the federal government, striking down 3 of the laws 4 provisions on the 
basis of their interference with and/or encroachment on federal efforts in Arizona v. United States. The Supreme 
Court left the controversial “papers, please” provision intact but the story did not end there. In 2016, following years 
of lawsuits targeting the law (or what was left of it), the state of Arizona, conceded, settled, and the state Attorney 
General issued an instruction to police officers to ignore this most controversial feature.212  
As to whether or not S.B. 1070 had a positive effect on the perceived crisis for the period it was in effect? 
The results are murky at best. Some proponents of S.B. 1070 claimed highly inflated crime reduction numbers 
following (and causally related) to S.B. 1070.  However, according to FBI and Department of Safety (DPS) 
statistics, there was an approximately 9-13 percent decline in the state’s crime index between 2010 and 2014. This is 
hardly a proof of a causal relationship as crime had already begun to steadily decline prior to S.B. 1070’s passage 
(beginning in 2002).213 Analysis also showed that the effect S.B. 1070 had on the reduction of the number of 
unauthorized individuals to be extremely limited raising additional concerns/questions, “[t]he fact that SB1070 
appears to have had a minimal to null impact on the share of likely unauthorized immigrants in the state questions 
the merit of the law and, more broadly, a piece-meal approach to immigration enforcement.”214 
In 2011, South Carolina endeavored to introduce similar legislation, Act No. 69 (also known as S.B. 20).215 
Although not as restrictive as Arizona’s, the law raised immediate discrimination and preemption concerns amongst 
advocates and the federal government alike.  
In the case of South Carolina, the law included provisions such as e-verification of status prior to 
employment, felony charges for production of fake IDs for illegal residents and transportation of illegal immigrants, 
as well as the creation of a new state immigration law enforcement unit. In defense of the law, South Carolina 
officials invoked familiar arguments about federal inaction, “‘[i]f the feds were doing their job, we wouldn't have 
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had to address illegal immigration reform at the state level," Rob Godfrey said. "But, until they do, we're going to 
keep fighting in South Carolina to be able to enforce our laws.’”216 Less clear, as Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 
aptly noted, is what empirical evidence, or even anecdotal evidence, South Carolina provided to support the 
measures. Whereas Arizona could point to a porous border to its south, South Carolina’s geography does not put it 
in nearly the geographically compromised position as its ideological cousin, Arizona. 
Before South Carolina’s law could be implemented, it too was subjected to federal lawsuit, with the Justice 
Department questioning the constitutionality of the law. Certain provisions of Act No. 69 were found to be 
“unconstitutional” and interfering with the federal government’s “authority to set and enforce immigration 
policy.”217 By 2014, South Carolina had entered into a settlement which rendered the most controversial aspects of 
the bill inert, specifically those that criminalized daily interactions with undocumented immigrants and imposed 
criminal penalties on those who failed to carry immigration documents.218 
Similarly, Alabama’s 2011 H.B. 56 was enacted by a Republican governor and Republican legislature. The 
law, entitled the “Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act,'' was one of the most restrictive and controversial 
efforts of the 21st century. Within days of its signing, H.B. 56 found rebuke not just from the Department of Justice, 
but also the Departments of Homeland Security, State, and Education (in addition to public reproach) “on the basis 
of preemption and violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.”219 Ten of the bill’s provisions were 
challenged and ultimately 7 were enjoined.  
The three remaining provisions still rendered Alabama one of the most restrictive and inhospitable states to 
illegal immigrants. Alabama may, in this case, be able to argue that the law achieved its end, to reduce the number 
of illegal immigrants residing in Alabama, pushing them out and toward other states. Perhaps less predictable was 
the cooling effect that the law had on legal immigration alike.220 As the 2020 census approaches, Alabama stands to 
lose a Congressional seat due to stagnant population growth. Although Alabama has sued the Department of 
Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau to stop them from counting undocumented individuals in the upcoming census, 
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it has been argued that it isn’t just the undocumented immigrants who hurt Alabama’s population count, “according 
to U.S. Census estimates, Alabama ranks No. 46 in the nation when it comes to attracting new residents from 
abroad.”221 
A cross-section of the most notable restrictive immigration efforts since the start of the 21st century reveals 
several common themes. Federal inaction was invoked as a primary reason for action in each of the states examined. 
Each of the sub-federal laws was focused on illegal immigration, rather than immigration in the broader sense. 
Empirical evidence of the deleterious effects of illegal immigration seemed to be lacking in each of the cases, as was 
evidence of the immediate and long-term benefits of the programs (in the instances where laws persisted). 
Secondary and negative consequences of the efforts appeared in several instances (i.e. in Alabama the law created 
environment perceived to be inhospitable to legal immigrants, and in both Alabama and Georgia, the laws had a 
negative effect on the agriculture industry which is supported in large part by migrant labor, and was not easily 
replaced by American labor222). At the height of the restrictive efforts, there was a notable juxtaposition of ruling 
parties (sub-federal level was Republican-run (Governor and/or legislature), while the federal government was led 
by Democrats.) Of the five states that drafted restrictive omnibus bills following Arizona’s lead in 2011, including 
the two listed above as well as Georgia, Indiana and Utah, all were challenged on the basis of preemption and the 
laws have been “wholly or partially barred from taking effect.”223 
Immigration as a States Rights Issue: Permissive Efforts 
In contrast to restrictive efforts, the first two decades of the 21st century also saw a bevy of permissive 
efforts. These efforts had contradictory aims to those outlined above and attempted to integrate and welcome 
immigrants into local communities by providing services and limiting local law enforcement cooperation with 
federal immigration enforcement. As in the case of the restrictive efforts, permissive efforts were not only about 
responding to a real-world need but also intended to “change the tenor of national discourse on immigration 
policy.”224 The rash of permissive efforts also has had a standout contributor, with California at the forefront. 
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The so-called “California package” of integrative immigration policy225 included evidence of nearly all of 
the most notable pro-immigration/immigrant policies of the 21st century. California has passed laws which place 
limits on detainers (sharing information with federal law enforcement) and e-Verify, provide identification (driver’s 
licenses) to recipients of DACA as well as unauthorized immigrants, and permit unauthorized immigrants to apply 
for in-state tuition as well as financial aid. 
California’s 2018 law, S.B. 54, otherwise known as the “California Values Act,” promoted sanctuary 
policies to the state level by limiting cooperation by local law enforcement with federal authorities. Senator Kevin 
de Leon, the author of the bill, stated “"I wanted to make sure that our local police officers, our sheriffs, were not a 
cog in the Trump deportation machine, separating innocent mothers from their children and children from their 
fathers."226 
In the case of A.B. 450, the “Immigrant Worker Protection Act”, California employers were prohibited 
from allowing immigration agents access to a non-public area of a workplace or to private employee records without 
legal process.227 In response to federal challenges to the law, its author, State Assemblyman David Chiu, D-San 
Francisco, described federal efforts as “racist immigration policies” further stating, "[i]t is up to all of us, in our 
individual ways, to resist the war on immigrants in the United States."228 
In 2016 and 2017, with Assembly Bill (A.B) 103, state budget legislation, and S.B. 29 (Dignity Not 
Detention Act) the state of California also took aim at federal immigration detention facilities and policy, putting a 
moratorium on new facilities as well as giving the state Attorney General  the power to inspect private, federal, 
immigration detention facilities, following a slew of complaints.229 According to Sen. Ricardo Lara, D-Bell Gardens, 
the laws attempted to “ensure the human rights and dignity of those immigrants detained in [California].”230 
And the Trump Administration’s Justice Department’s response was equally as swift. In March 2018, the 
U.S. Department of Justice filed suit against California officials, “seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief 
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based upon the enactment and implementation of certain provisions of three California laws.”231 On the basis of 
preemption, the Justice Department sought to “permanently enjoin these state statutes, which are contrary to federal 
law and interfere with federal immigration authorities’ ability to carry out their lawful duties.”232 However, the 
Trump administration found less success in its challenges. In March 2018, U.S. District Court Judge John Mendez 
rejected the administration’s request to block S.B. 54 and A.B. 103. Mendez did block a portion of S.B. 450, which 
prohibited employers from voluntarily providing federal immigration authorities from access to facilities but left 
other provisions of S.B. 450 intact. In his decision, Mendez argued that sanctuary laws "are permissible exercises of 
California's sovereign power."233 In April 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with 
Mendez, upholding his ruling that the sanctuary laws did not conflict with federal immigration law, finding that 
although there is “no doubt that S.B. 54 makes the jobs of federal immigration authorities more difficult...California 
has the right ... to refrain from assisting with federal efforts."234 
However, Mendez’s ruling did not come without criticism of the perceived partisan origins of the debate, 
“[T]his Court joins the ever-growing chorus of Federal Judges in urging our elected officials to set aside the partisan 
and polarizing politics dominating the current immigration debate. ... Our Nation deserves it. Our Constitution 
demands it.”235 Mendez further argued that a solution would not come through “piecemeal opinions issued by the 
judicial branch."236  
As to whether the laws were successful? California would argue yes. Although some of the laws aims are 
hard to quantify (i.e. creating a more inclusive environment) others can arguably be defined (i.e. in February 2019, 
the California Attorney General released its first report on immigration detention facilities in an attempt to increase 
transparency and improve standards of care).237 
As was the case with restrictive efforts, numerous states followed California’s suit, enacting a bevy of 
permissive state and local laws and resolutions aimed at creating an environment welcoming and friendly to 
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immigrants. In 2019, over 300 jurisdictions, including at least 8 states, were considered “immigration sanctuaries” 
(more generally jurisdictions which limit cooperation on federal detainers).238 Although the current administration 
has undertaken efforts to penalize states and cities with so-called “sanctuary” policies by withholding federal 
funding, but courts have thus far blocked these efforts.239 However, “sanctuary” policies were not the only form 
permissive efforts were modeled after.  
In 2019, Colorado undertook efforts to remove immigration and citizenship status as requirements to apply 
for a state occupational license. Occupational licensing is seen as a potential major barrier to the successful 
integration and support of the sizeable immigrant population in the U.S.240 Foreign-trained workers and U.S.-trained 
immigrants are able to help alleviate shortages in many professional fields, however, often face difficulty in 
obtaining the professional licenses and/or credential required in their field. This leaves a substantial part of the 
potential workforce underemployed.241 Colorado’s bill, A.B. 275, went into effect July 1, 2019 and although it 
passed, divisions over the bill were generally party-centric (Republicans dissenting and Democrats unanimously 
supporting). The author of the bill, Las Vegas Democratic Assemblywoman Selena Torres, stated that the bill 
“completely coincide[d] with the federal statutes that already exist”242 which lead to the bipartisan support required 
to narrowly pass it. The bill, although not a work authorization, provided greater career opportunities for a number 
of classes of immigrants (to include DACA recipients as well as green card holders, asylum seekers, and refugees). 
Lalo Montoya, the political director for Make the Road Nevada and member of the coalition supporting the bill 
through its passage, indicated “[t]he state legislature knows these sort of laws are needed because we’re working 
under a broken immigration system. This gives everyone an opportunity to contribute economically.”243 A number 
of states have enacted and/or are pursuing similar legislation and results seem to be positive, “[i]mmigrant 
professionals are filling labor shortages and helping local businesses grow.”244 
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Providing driver’s licenses for DACA recipients and unauthorized immigrants has been another 
controversial permissive effort that a number of states have undertaken in recent years. In 2019, New York state 
joined 12 other states, as well as Washington D.C., by approving a bill granting driver’s licenses to undocumented 
immigrants. This thrust New York into “the center of the explosive national debate over immigration” and 
“revers[ed] a nearly 20-year-old ban and end[ed] years of political paralysis on the issue.”245 Debate surrounding the 
bill was largely partisan in nature, with Republicans (in particular) concerned that the bill would ultimately reward 
those breaking the law by being in the country illegally and expressing worries about potential risks these 
individuals pose to national security. However, Democrats in support of the bill emphasized its potential for not only 
inclusiveness but also public safety and economic benefit.  Ultimately, in this case, federal inaction also remained a 
common theme. According to Andrea Stewart-Cousins, the leader of the Senate Democratic majority, the bill 
represented “the right step forward for New York State as we continue to advocate for comprehensive immigration 
reform on the federal level.”246 
A cross-section of the most notable permissive immigration efforts since the start of the 21st century also 
revealed a number of common themes. Federal inaction and/or the lack of comprehensive immigration reform 
remained a primary talking point. In contrast to restrictive efforts, permissive efforts focused on immigration in the 
broader sense, not only addressing unauthorized (illegal) immigrants. Empirical evidence supporting the passage of 
the bills as well as their resultant achievements was also sparse, due in part to the difficulty in tracking and 
quantifying the results of some of these efforts as well as their recency. However, there also did not appear to be 
substantial evidence of the secondary and negative consequences that many of the law’s opponents feared (i.e. 
exploitation of the driver’s license provision by would-be terrorists.) Conversely to the restrictive efforts, permissive 
efforts have not endured nearly the same legal challenge and those challenges that have been undertaken have been 
largely unsuccessful. The most consistent theme across efforts was the partisan nature of the efforts support and the 
relevance of the majority/ruling party to the nature of the effort (sub-federal level was Democrat-run (Governor 
and/or legislature), while the federal government was Republican-led.)  
CONCLUSIONS:  
                                               






The hyperpartisan environment which has developed since the turn of the century, and at a heightened rate 
since the 2016 election, has brought new and unprecedented challenges to the American political system. Congress 
has progressed to near deadlock, finding itself unable, or unwilling, to find bipartisan policy solutions to some of the 
U.S.’ most urgent policy issues. Using immigration as a case study, this paper attempted to determine if sub-federal 
legislation on traditionally federal issues represented a viable alternative.  
Indeed, some of the presuppositions held true, hyperpartisanship has a hold on Congress and a real effect 
on policy (or the lack thereof), in particular immigration reform. Federal inaction on immigration was a familiar 
refrain amongst those pursuing both permissive and restrictive sub-federal legislation. Immigration federalism was 
also bolstered by a number of court decisions which denied that sub-federal legislation ran afoul of federal 
supremacy and/or preemption. However, there also appeared to be limited empirical evidence supporting the real-
world crisis rhetoric and ultimate success of the sub-federal efforts. For those efforts with definable and calculable 
ends (i.e. reduction in crime, increased employment opportunities for citizens, decrease in drug activity, etc.) there 
was little literature available that proved the success of the state level effort. Conversely, many of the permissive 
effort’s successes were similarly hard to calculate (albeit for different reasons, these generally had less definable 
ends). There was also limited evidence to show that more permissive efforts led to the negative effects their 
opponents feared (i.e. increase in crime, drug activity, etc.) Instead, the strong rhetoric of both sides was left 
unsubstantiated in many cases. Rather than finding real solutions to what is perceived as a top national 
priority/problem, the sub-federal legislation appeared to be as much about affirming a particular view as it was 
overcoming Congressional deadlock to find legitimate alternatives that are feasible in a country with porous borders 
and full faith and credit. This raised into question the advisability of these piecemeal/patchwork efforts in a nation 
that is built on the unification of diverse parts. Ultimately, it appeared that the juxtaposition of party leadership (sub-
federal vs. federal) was a relatively good indicator of a state or local jurisdictions pursuit of sub-federal immigration 
legislation. In fact, an overlay of a map of sub-federal immigration legislation with a map of state party affiliation 




legislation.247 248 This begs an important question, is sub-federal legislation of immigration really a solution to 
hyperpartisanship or is it also a symptom? 
Despite the seemingly obvious partisan origins of many of the sub-federal efforts, one noticeable trend was 
how permissive efforts fared as compared to restrictive efforts. Efforts that aimed for inclusiveness and integration 
withstood legal challenges at a much better rate than did those that were exclusionary and created environments 
inhospitable to immigrants (both legal and illegal alike). Perhaps this signals something about American values, 
despite the partisan rhetoric that is most often featured. At the core, the U.S. is still a country that holds true to the 
values on which it was founded, values which will endure despite frequent and persistent challenges to the contrary.  
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Smoke and Mirrors: The Persistence of Marijuana Prohibition  
The Power of Cultural Frames in Overcoming Partisan Politics 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
The war on drugs began during the Nixon administration, when “many Americans felt that drug use had 
become a serious threat to the country and its moral standing.”249 However, more than 30 years later, the calls for 
reform of the war on drugs have gotten louder and louder. As of the writing of this chapter, medicinal marijuana is 
legal in 33 states and recreational marijuana is legal in eleven states and Washington D.C.250 Clearly, there is a 
movement amongst the states away from prohibition and toward legalization or decriminalization and this 
movement is widely supported (according to a recent poll, 62% of Americans state they support legalizing 
marijuana).251 And yet the laws at the federal level persist. As recently as 2018, then Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
removed the barrier that had held back federal prosecutors from pursuing marijuana cases in states that had made pot 
legal,252 doubling down on the federal government’s support of prohibition, despite public pressure to the contrary. 
The prohibition of alcohol, occurring nationwide from 1920-1933, was undertaken as an attempt to “reduce 
crime and corruption, solve social problems, reduce the tax burden created by prisons and poorhouses, and improve 
health and hygiene in America.”253 History, and the 21st amendment, show that prohibition of alcohol was a 
miserable failure, and as such, rightfully abandoned. So why then has the prohibition of marijuana persisted? Is there 
a legitimate belief that the prohibition of marijuana will produce substantially different results or are there other 
elements and interests at play? 
Chapters one and two of this portfolio examined, through the lens of controversial issues, current dynamics 
at play in the U.S. democracy (to include hyperpartisanship) and their significance to the future health of the same. 
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Chapter two, through the lens of the issue of immigration, examined whether state-led legislation of traditionally 
federal issues represented a potential solution to the perceived hyperpartisan deadlock that has plagued Congress. In 
the process of this examination, a separate but related theme emerged, the phenomenon of “issue entrepreneurs.”254 
In the case of immigration, it was noted that the rash of restrictive immigration efforts that the U.S. experienced 
were not inevitable, but rather it took “the work of a handful of dedicated policy activists to capitalize on these 
political opportunities to block immigration reform at the national level and then proliferate restrictive legislation at 
the local level.”255 Is it possible that the prohibition of marijuana has suffered the same influence? Enterprising 
individuals seize emotionally charged issues, rooted in discussions of morality, during times of political opportunity 
to push a particular policy agenda. Is there anything unique about the phenomenon of issue “influencers” and their 
capacity to drive policy direction in the hyperpartisan 21st century? And what does this mean for the future of 
American democracy? 
Not unlike the lessons of alcohol prohibition in the 1920s-30s, the war on drugs has not been successful in 
eradicating drug abuse. Further, many of the same negative effects are present as they were during the prohibition 
years – consumption ultimately increased, alcohol, unregulated, became dangerous to consume, crime increased, 
courts and prisons were stretched to the breaking point, etc.256 If it took only 13 years to determine alcohol 
prohibition was a failure, why spend over 30 on the war against drugs, and in particular, marijuana? 
By examining the existing literature on prohibition in the historical context, the role “issue entrepreneurs” 
or representatives of special interests have played, as well as the theory behind the legislation of moral issues and 
narrative framing, this paper will examine whether or not issues rooted in morality suffer a particular vulnerability to 
the agendas of special interests, particularly during times of social upheaval and partisan divisions.  
This paper will then turn to the evolution of the prohibition of marijuana over the years as a case study of 
the issue, to examine the possibility that the prohibition of marijuana has persisted due to the influence of some 
underlying interest, motivated by profit or power, emboldened by the political opportunity presented by a 
hyperpartisan environment. Is the prohibition of marijuana, which has far outlasted the prohibition of alcohol, 
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substantially different than the much shorter-lived prohibition of alcohol in either substance or success? If so, there 
would be little need for a paper addressing this issue. However, if not, and marijuana prohibition is not rightfully 
seated in a discussion of what is “best” for this country from either an ethical or scientific (medical) perspective then 
why does it persist? Or, like other issues, and failed efforts at moral legislation through prohibition has the issue 
been hijacked and exploited by some other underlying interest to a far greater cost than benefit?  
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
Previous scholarship has provided a framework that provides context to the issue, including the historical 
legacy of prohibition, issues and challenges regarding the legislation of morality in the United States, the role of 
special interests in public policy, and the power of framing and narrative development in driving policy action, 
particularly on controversial, partisan issues. 
Understanding Prohibition in Historical Context: 
Before addressing the prohibition of marijuana particularly, it is important to devote sufficient attention to 
the U.S.’ past experience with prohibition efforts. The United States has a controversial history with various forms 
of prohibition, but perhaps no better known and more spectacularly abandoned than alcohol. Through the lens of 
alcohol, answers to questions relevant to the continued prohibition of marijuana will hopefully emerge: What factors 
motivated the prohibition of alcohol? Did prohibition of alcohol achieve any of its ends? Did the government 
rightfully assert its authority in legislating an issue of moral consequence? And what led to its ultimate failure?  
 Much scholarship has been devoted to the historical context in which the prohibition of alcohol emerged, in 
particular the context of temperance reform. It is argued that temperance reformers were responding to real, not 
imagined, problems that were largely attributed to alcohol.257 However, despite “real” problems, ultimately the 
question of temperance reform boiled down to “whose cultural standards should be sanctioned in the public life of 
the nation”258 and that concerns pointed to basic issues such as “power, culture, and authority.”259 With a tenuous 
balance between liberty and order, the efforts undertaken by the temperance movement (i.e. the prohibition of 
alcohol) meant that Americans needed to accept the expansion of government rule over individual behavior (a 
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significant shift toward the modern state of government.) However, prohibition was ultimately a failure, in large part 
due to the inability to enforce it. And its failure is an important reminder of “the limitations and dangers of 
government intervention in general and moral regulation in particular.”260 In Thomas Pegram’s 1998 book, Battling 
Demon Rum, Pegram suggests that the ultimate argument against alcohol prohibition was that the U.S. government, 
and its legacy to protect liberty, had no business legislating behavior that represented a personal choice. The 
continued success and legitimacy of the U.S. democracy is dependent on a commitment to protecting this. 
According to Pegram, legislation of “moral” issues will always be failures in this country. 
Other analyses analogize alcohol prohibition in the early-mid 1900s to more contemporary examples, the 
failure of which represents a lesson applicable to the war on drugs, and other efforts at legislating morality such as 
censorship, abortion and even gambling. Prohibition, which was intended to “solve social problems, reduce the tax 
burden created by prisons and poorhouses, and improve health and hygiene in America” was a “miserable failure on 
all accounts.”261 From an economic perspective, “prohibition of mutually beneficial exchanges is doomed to 
failure.”262 Amongst the evidence of the failure of alcohol prohibition were the facts that although consumption 
initially fell, it subsequently increased; without regulation, alcohol became more dangerous to consume; crime 
increased; prison systems were stretched to the breaking point; corruption became rampant; and ultimately 
prohibition cost the government dearly financially, removing a significant source of revenue and increasing 
spending in the effort to fight consumption and production.263 Although the effort brought about an initial decrease 
in consumption, the initial decrease was not nearly significant enough to stand in defense in prohibition, since the 
decrease in supply and increase in price would logically lead to some decrease in consumption. Additionally, after 
the initial decrease, consumption increased. As people were forced to spend more to consume (as the black market 
for alcohol grew) so was the government forced to spend more toward enforcement.  
Out of these analyses grew the concept of the “Iron Law of Prohibition,” one of the most notable of the 
consequences prohibition caused. This “law” predicts that “the more intense the law enforcement, the more potent 
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the prohibited substance becomes.”264 In turn, the more dangerous the substance becomes. According to scholars, 
the Iron Law undermines any potential benefit that one could see from a nominal decrease in consumption.  
Ultimately, prohibition of alcohol was a complete failure in all of its efforts to improve health and virtue in 
America.265 The benefits of the repeal of Prohibition (reduction in crime, creation of jobs, voluntary efforts to help 
alcoholics) were much greater than any possible, and certainly any realized, benefits from the Prohibition 
experiment.  
American Efforts in Morality Legislation 
A primary, and important, component in understanding morality legislation is to examine how an issue is 
defined as having a basis in “morality.” This is important to the broader question of how that issue is understood, 
what the relevant influences are, and what particular outcome policy should attempt to achieve as a result. Moral 
Foundations Theory (MFT) assists in this effort by helping to define core values (psychological foundations) that 
identify moral components to a particular issue. These foundations include: Care/Harm, Fairness/Reciprocity, In-
group/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity.266  Although an issue may be multi-faceted, “[a]policy is 
classified as a morality policy based on the perceptions of the actors involved and the terms of the debate among 
them.”267  
 Although alcohol represented one of the U.S. most well-known experiments and failures in the legislation 
of morality, it certainly wasn’t the only one. Moral legislation occurs when “a social majority objects morally to the 
specific conduct, value-system, or culture of others and imposes regulation upon them.”268 Scholars point to three 
major prohibition movements in the twentieth century which were considerable failures: alcohol, prostitution, and 
drugs.269 In each case, the common and “misconceived foundation” on which they were based was the “legal 
enforcement of morality.”270 As further described below, each also has foundations in questions of purity/sanctity 
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and in-group/loyalty as defined by MFT. All of the prohibitions (including drug) have been ineffective in achieving 
their stated goals, and have many unintended social costs.271 In the case of alcohol prohibition, it is argued that the 
motivation for prohibition stemmed not only from the temperance movement but also in response to the “immigrant 
throngs that threatened to undermine the cultural dominance of the established Anglo-Saxon population.”272 It is 
easy to see the correlation with the current prohibition of marijuana (and more broadly drugs in general), which is 
often argued in the broader context of race, border, and migrant issues. In regards to the war on drugs specifically, 
despite extraordinary government spending, the number of drug users has remained constant.273 In addition to 
financial costs (related to enforcement and incarceration), there are also extreme social costs, including lost wages, 
stigma, personal costs, loss of job, violence, and social disintegration.274  
In the case of prostitution, some scholars have drawn attention to prostitution’s origins (on the North 
American continent) in colonialism and dominance of the immigrant population over the indigenous.275 As is the 
case for drug enforcement, in which there is a decidedly racial component (with people of color disproportionately 
represented),276 “predominant paths of enforcement” developed “that often traced racial lines.”277 Issues (and 
discomforts) regarding race and gender are intrinsically intertwined with the ultimate policy, the aim of which was 
(is) to combat issues prostitution was perceived to have created such as “public-health problems...a plethora of other 
crimes, including robbery and murder; and ...moral and societal decadence.”278 But the reality of which is a 
consistent and exacerbated marginalization of some of society's most vulnerable populations. The moral legislation 
was rooted in broader societal issues related to, again, cultural dominance.  
Abortion, same-sex marriage, euthanasia, and even marijuana prohibition have generally been issues which 
display a stark partisan divide on support for and against, each sides argument rooted in their unique understanding 
of both individual and collective morality, indicating that there is something concrete and persistent about the role 
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partisanship plays in morality policy. Can these issues and the resultant policy output be simply understood through 
a general understanding of a particular party’s moral stance(es)? Some argue no, it isn't that simple. Generally 
speaking, moral issues can represent a minefield for political parties, “unlike in many other policy areas, political 
parties and their constituencies are often internally split on morality issues, implying that parties usually have only 
little to gain and much to lose from politicising morality policies.”279 However, there is a recognizable partisan 
divide in related policy output (or the lack thereof). Therefore, partisanship should be understood to be much more 
nuanced and evolving than it might seem when it comes to morality legislation. In this context, morality policy must 
be understood by focusing on a number of “cleavages,” not simply left and right, but also “secular‐religious 
dimensions...between materialism and postmaterialism, green‐alternative‐libertarian and traditional‐authoritarian‐
nationalist…”280 Outcomes and parties must also be looked at over time and the unit of analysis must be well 
defined.281 
As a final thought, some argue that legislative focus on issues that have foundations in morality (as defined 
by MFT) such as terrorism and drugs, provide a form of relief to legislators.  As an example, some argue that the 
war on drugs ultimately represents a war on lifestyle, one that legislators continue to support primarily in order to 
avoid discussions about more difficult, truly controversial, topics such as schools, housing, and employment.282 
These arguments, and analogous examples, have universal applicability and these final thoughts shed interesting and 
thought provoking light on possible motivations for the continued pursuit of marijuana prohibition in this context, 
perhaps the topic of the evils of drugs had (until recently) become so universally uncontroversial that focusing on it 
enabled legislators to avoid harder topics. 
Issue Frames and Narrative Development 
During a review of the literature relevant to the topic, it quickly became apparent that a discussion of 
controversial issues and issue entrepreneurs would not be complete without a discussion of the power of frames in 
politics. Framing, in this context, is well-defined by Robert Entman as “selecting and highlighting some facets of 
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events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or 
solution.”283 Entman invokes framing as a powerful tool used by the media and politicians alike to affect (wittingly 
or otherwise) the public view on certain issues and recognizes the potential challenges (“unsettling implications”284) 
frames present to democracy, “[s]ometimes frames are so deeply ingrained or institutionalized that they are for all 
intents and purposes unassailable (even if they should be assailed).”285 
On the foreign policy front, it has been argued that in the post-Cold War world, that the media has infinitely 
more power to frame issues than those who traditionally delivered and sculpted the narrative - the President. In 
particular, in the case of the war in Iraq, the Bush administration argued that the media focused far too much on the 
negative aspects than the positive progress that was being made, “[t]he real problem was that the administration’s 
rhetorical framing of the occupation - that of spreading freedom and democracy - clashed with the pictures, stories 
and death tolls that appeared on the nightly news.”286 Frames, according to Entman, are important because “they not 
only influence public opinion, they suggest an appropriate policy response.”287 Entman also posits a “cascading 
activation” model for understanding how frames are developed and spread. In this model, frame activation is spread 
through four mechanisms (motivations, cultural congruence, power, and strategy) through administration officials, 
opinion elites, journalists, and ultimately the general public. Of particular interest in Entman’s model is the cultural 
congruence factor, which states that in, “in order to be accepted, a foreign policy frame must be congruent with 
dominant schemas in our political culture, and be cognitively easy to process.”288 Entman also indicated that there is 
the potential for so-called “splash back,” when a counter frame adopted by the public influences the discussion of 
the issue at the elite level. However, this is dependent on the media’s use of public opinion as a source (over the 
administration), which for the purpose of Entman’s discussion of foreign policy is less likely (but perhaps has more 
applicability to the topic at hand).289  
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Others have examined the power of framing relative specifically to the gun control debate, namely how 
marked differences in how the gun control debate is framed explains (in part) why an “antigun coalition” has found 
success in Canada but not in the U.S.290 The media, political parties, and political executives, have all played a major 
role with respect to the salience of the issue of gun control. In the case of Canada, the 1989 Montreal Massacre was 
a turning point that correlated gun control with women’s safety in a way it had not previously been. This shift in 
public understanding (reframing) of the issue meant that a strong antigun lobby developed. The media was found to 
have focused on a “gun control” frame in Canada far more than in the United States, where a “gun rights frame 
predominated.”291 Partisan polarization on the issue was also much more extreme in the U.S. than in Canada, 
attributed in part to a stronger antigun lobby in Canada. However, these frames and developments don’t exist in a 
political vacuum. The political culture in Canada, which leans more toward “communitarian” is also a major 
contributing factor, as opposed to the “individualistic” nature of her neighbor.292 
In the case of the NRA, a strategic decision to frame litigation against handgun bans as “infringements on 
the right to self-defense,”293 represented an extremely successful “alignment of legal and cultural frames.”294 By the 
late 1990s, the NRA realized that support for military-style weapons had become “politically and culturally 
untenable.”295 Although the NRA has not totally abandoned support for military style weapons “its litigation team 
steered clear of an outright challenge, indicating that the lobby had learned the value of cultural frame alignment.”296  
The NRA even capitalized on the frame of “black rights” and the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment in the post-
Civil War era (ensuring protection for freed slaves), aligning the legal frame of private gun ownership with a 
compelling (and progressive) cultural frame.297 Ultimately, to be successful, activists (or lobbies) need to construct 
their own frame by diagnosing a social problem, identifying a clear prognosis for that problem, and then mobilizing 
the public to solve the problem.298 The more this attempt aligns with beliefs already held by the public, the more 
likely it is to be successful.299 
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The Role and Power of Special Interests and Lobbies 
 Although teased out above in both Canada’s experience with the success of the antigun lobby and in 
chapter one (which explored the power of the NRA in countering some of the very same antigun movements that 
emerged after focusing events, as detailed above), it is worth briefly returning to the role of special interests in the 
context at hand. 
 As was previously explored, politics in the U.S. is heavily influenced by special interests and lobbying 
groups. It is argued that these small but moneyed groups have “far too much power over policymakers, blocking 
people from receiving fair representation and responsive, accountable governance.”300 Lobbying, in theory, can play 
an important role in expanding a politician's understanding of issues, however the benefit of this is counteracted by 
the money that flows through the process. Lobbyists can “buy” support for their clients through fundraising for and 
contributing to Congressional campaigns. Members of Congress have also become overly dependent on lobbyists to 
inform their policy strategy, in part due to the limited staff available to them to conduct more independent 
research.301 The result, it is argued, is that corporate interests have an outsized influence on the development of U.S. 
domestic and foreign policy. 
Special interests significantly grew in influence throughout the ‘60s and ‘70s but saw a decline throughout 
the Reagan and Bush administrations.302 Reagan in particular, warned of the power of special interests. which both 
subvert and distract the public interest and throw off the “constitutional balance.” 303 Here, special interests are 
defined as a “fairly small number of intense  supporters who cannot expect that their cause will receive strong 
support from the general public except under unusual circumstances.”304 Special interests work by leveraging 
relationships with strategically chosen congressmen and women, those for whom the particular “interest” is of 
constituent interest or concern.  
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However, despite certain representations that decry the outsized influence of special interests and lobbies, it 
has also been argued that since the 1980s, special interests have declined in their influence.305 It has also been 
argued that the rise and diversification of media informing the public has helped to counterbalance special 
interests.306 Media, by transforming “real events and issues - including public policy issues - into entertaining 
stories” has been able to make “elected representatives more sensitive to the interests of their constituencies and less 
prone to excessive influence or capture by special interests.”307 
A series of essential themes emerged from a review of the relevant literature. Broadly, moral legislation 
(and prohibition) originates from an existential fear of the “other”, a perceived war on culture, or an infringement on 
one's understanding of what American life “should be.” In this, there is a very strong correlation with race and 
ethnicity. This fear may be based on some true societal ills (based on one’s perspective) but legislation of 
personal/moral behavior will never be effective in removing that fear from society. Special interests and “issue 
entrepreneurs” may also play a role in framing the issue in such a way that it builds on and caters to these fears, 
despite lacking in real-world evidence supporting the social ills prohibition claims to prevent and the benefits it 
promises to deliver. This fallacy was well-demonstrated through the alcohol prohibition experiment. The power of 
framing is evident in the “anti-drug” and “anti-marijuana” front and certainly within the pro-gun, but Entman’s (and 
others) work show that there is great opportunity for a reframing of the issue, if the right players (administration, 
elites, media, and/or public) can capitalize on a particular event or harness the power of a more democratic media.  
A compelling argument that it isn’t in the best interest of American society or democracy to even attempt to 
legislate moral issues also emerged, that this runs counter to the principles on which this country was built. Which 
begs the question if this process of prohibiting behavior one believes to be threatening to a way of life isn’t going to 
be a constant feature in the U.S., which is based on immigrant populations and is a melting pot of cultures and 
norms. Or at least if this fact won’t continue to be exploited by enterprising individuals who see a (often partisan) 
personal benefit. Clearly the U.S. continues to wrestle with this legacy today and there will likely always be an 
“other” encroaching on the standard of living that Americans believe to be right. Is prohibition simply the legislative 
manifestation of this fear? One that will never solve the problem (or even the more mundane elements it claims to 
                                               
305 Ibid, 556. 
306 Alexander, Dyck, David Moss, and Luigi Zingales, "Media versus Special Interests." The Journal of Law & Economics 56, no. 3 (2013). 
doi:10.1086/673216. 




address?) Ultimately the concept of “cultural congruence” was present in virtually every aspect of the literature 
review, both generally and specifically. In order to understand why certain issues find public support and/or policy 
resolve and others do not, it is necessary to understand elemental aspects of what it means to be an American.  
Arguably, the American public has moved on from this fear, at least as it relates to marijuana. The 
criminalization of marijuana has become one of the least, publicly, controversial issues, enjoying greater and more 
bipartisan, support than ever before. The following section will attempt to discern to what extent the marijuana 
experiment has mirrored the alcohol experiment. Although the two may share origins, they have clearly diverged in 
their longevity. State decriminalization and legalization efforts are at an all-time high as is public support. However, 
significantly increased public support for marijuana legalization has shared a temporal trajectory with the 
increasingly partisan environment in Washington D.C. To what extent does this correlation explain the issue’s 
persistence? What holds back Congress from pushing forward on at least one issue that seems to, uncontroversially, 
not just require but demand its attention? Has the hyperpartisanship of the 21st century exposed a vulnerability 
exploited by enterprising individuals? 
METHODOLOGY: Case Study 
As was briefly examined, alcohol prohibition was born during a period of social disquiet and in part, in 
response to concerns about perceived threats to cultural norms. However, alcohol prohibition also lived a relatively 
short life, the shortcomings and failures of the effort recognized and abandoned. The prohibition of marijuana seems 
to share many of the same characteristics with the prohibition of alcohol, yet has persisted far longer. In the face of 
overwhelming public support for the legalization and/or decriminalization of marijuana, why has this been the case? 
What role have special interests played in making its prohibition a partisan/political issue? What role, if any, have 
“issue entrepreneurs” played in capitalizing on the particularly partisan environment to extend the life of this issue 
past its natural course? Over the years, marijuana has begun to enjoy increasingly bipartisan support amongst the 
American public, yet there remains continued hesitation at the federal level to decriminalize its use.  Has it simply 
become a sign of a broken system? 




In John Kaplan’s book “Marijuana: The New Prohibition,” Kaplan approached the question of marijuana 
prohibition after having been asked to participate in the Joint Legislative Committee to Revise the Penal Code of the 
State of California. Kaplan, a former AUSA in San Francisco and professor of criminal law knew little about 
drugs308 but ultimately reached the conclusion that “the many persons… who have up to now regarded marijuana as 
so dangerous that it must be suppressed in order to maintain our society, were somehow actuated by improper 
motives, or were irresponsible or blind.”309 The prohibition of marijuana has been the U.S.’ most “ambitious effort 
at drug control”310 and which was, at the same time, a spectacular failure.  
The passage of the Prohibition Amendment  resulted from pressure by “white rural Protestants to have 
made illegal a practice that they associated primarily with urban Roman Catholics.”311 It was a question of life-style, 
and alcohol was an easy feature of that perceived “immoral” lifestyle that could be corrected through the law. 
Similarly, it has been argued that marijuana prohibition is rooted in the “symbolic meaning of marijuana,”312which is 
to say prohibition is not based on the effects of the drug but rather disapproval with the perceived (and 
oversimplified) lifestyle of the user. According to Kaplan, strong puritanical influences are one source of these 
views and as well as perceptions such as radicalism, permissiveness, lack of respect for authority and two major 
societal problems, first, fear of violent crime, and second, the “conflict between the struggle of the Negro for 
equality and the conservative restraint of the law.”313  
Others point to the fact that marijuana enjoyed a relatively stigma-free and positive reputation, throughout 
time and geography, until abruptly meeting the early-20th century U.S., which also saw an “upsurge of nativism, 
scapegoating, and political repression.”314 Importantly, this period also brought about the Mexican Revolution, 
which “caused hundreds of thousands of brown-skinned migrants to flee to the U.S. Southwest in search of safety 
and work.” This migration sparked the initial impetus of marijuana prohibition which was rooted in fear of “an alien 
intrusion into American life.”315 These migrants brought with them a tradition of smoking marijuana and along with 
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that came fear and hostility, “early marijuana legislation was a handy instrument to keep the newcomers in their 
place.”316 Again, the key element of the U.S. drug policy being its selective nature, targeting a  “feared or disparaged 
group within society.”317   
Framing the issue in the context of the influx of immigrants from Mexico provides useful information for 
understanding the historical context of marijuana prohibition, marijuana became a symbol of generational and 
cultural conflict, therefore situated in a moral debate and not in a pragmatic one.  
By the early 1930s, marijuana prohibition found its first issue entrepreneur, Harry Anslinger, the head of 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Anslinger used marijuana to save the failing narcotics bureau, demanding 
immediate action and additional funding to fight the “scourge of marijuana.”318 At more or less the same time, New 
Orleans District Attorney Eugene Stanley had also “found a convenient scapegoat”319 in marijuana, a reason to 
explain the wave of crime that had overcome New Orleans. The confluence of several events created a hysteria of 
sorts, the dangers of marijuana became a feature of national headlines. Even though little scientific effort had been 
put into confirming or denying the claims, Anslinger capitalized on this hysteria to ensure support and funding for 
his agency. And Anslinger’s campaign against marijuana became a “self-perpetuating machine.”320 Over the decade 
that followed, studies were performed that largely disproved Anslinger’s claims about the drug, however, they were 
largely overshadowed by the events of the day, to include WWII. Anslinger has also been credited with the idea of 
marijuana as a gateway drug (in anticipation that other more dangerous drugs could become the priority Anslinger 
sealed the relevance of marijuana by claiming it was the gateway to these other more potent drugs).321  It was out of 
this seemingly misguided stance on marijuana that led it to become the drug of choice of the “counterculture” in the 
1960s and ultimately brought it fully into mainstream discussions.  
In the early 1970s, Nixon appointed the Shafer Commission to study marijuana and present its findings. 
Ultimately their report, Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding “debunked nearly everything the federal 
government had been claiming about marijuana for 40 years.”322 However, Nixon ultimately buried the report and 
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doubled down on his anti-marijuana/drug rhetoric, a key point that will be further explored. The later 1970s saw 
lackluster support from Carter and Congress, but the biggest issue marijuana faced was the lumping together of it 
with other “drugs.” In other words, there was no differentiation, which may have prompted marijuana to otherwise 
have redress. In the 1980s, faced with high disapproval ratings, Nancy Reagan adopted drugs as her raison d’etre 
and turned the fight against drugs into a war. This continued into the 1990s, and although laws didn’t change, 
enforcement did, becoming much more brutal and unforgiving. It wasn’t until the early 2000s, that the tides began to 
turn, and decriminalization and legalization of marijuana became a reality.    
Bruce Barcott introduces the idea that prohibition of marijuana has not persisted due to some large-scale 
conspiracy based in power or greed, but rather, has endured due to a series of compounding events that more or less 
amounted to the right person, paying the right amount attention, at the right time. A number of factors including 
historical (WWII), job security (Anslinger), popularity (Nancy Regan) led to the continuation of a narrative that had 
become uncontroversial, and not because the facts supporting it were uncontroversial, but rather, for a period of 
time, the public simply stopped questioning it.  
Marijuana the Myth: Placing Marijuana in Cultural Context 
Looking back through the histories of the prohibition of alcohol and marijuana, it is easy to spot the 
similarities. Both movements initially began as attempts to combat large scale use (and morphed into attempts to 
combat all use), both were accused of producing “crime, pauperism, and insanity,”323and both started at a local level 
and ultimately found support at the federal level. In the case of alcohol, there was also blatant disregard for the 
abstinence laws, but for twelve years, millions were spent by state and federal governments to attempt to ensure 
compliance.324 The general public has shown similar disregard and disinterest in the laws prohibiting marijuana as 
well,  the “widespread violation of the marijuana laws is itself proof…the users and many nonusers see no possible 
societal objection to an individual’s use of an apparently harmless euphoriant.”325  Given this, what is harder to 
understand is their differences, namely that one ended shortly after it began.  Some have predicted (since at least the 
1970s) that the marijuana laws would “not long exist in the current climate of changing values and increased use 
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among a sizeable segment of the ‘respectable’ public.”326 This “respectable” public has also been buoyed by the fact 
that when comparing the negative effects (to include criminality, physical damage to the user, psychological harm, 
and driving impairment) of marijuana versus those of alcohol,  the effects of alcohol are arguably more deleterious 
than those of marijuana.327 However, the relatively lower risks that are associated with marijuana use haven’t 
seemed to play a prominent role in evaluations of the substance’s prohibition. Rather, the criminalization of 
marijuana was “rooted in fiction as well as fact. Indeed, a public policy conceived in ignorance may be continuously 
reaffirmed, ever more vehemently, so long as its origins remain obscure or its fallacy unexposed.”328  
The general “flagrant disregard” by the public of marijuana laws speaks to a disenchantment with the law 
and the ability of the legal system to order society. Additionally, and importantly, the conjoining of the issue of 
marijuana with large social conflicts has “cosigned the debate to the public viscera instead of the public mind.”329 
However, the arguably lesser effects aren’t the only point on which the story of marijuana prohibition diverges from 
alcohol prohibition. The temperance movement, which gave rise to alcohol prohibition, was the matter of great 
public debate, whereas the anti-drug movement was not. Additionally, the temperance movement was undertaken to 
“eradicate known evils resulting from alcohol abuse,”330 whereas drug legislation was anticipatory in nature. Perhaps 
both of these facts, and more generally how the issue of marijuana prohibition has been framed (and by whom), 
provide a potential window into understanding the issues persistence. 
It appears that the “symbology” of the issue is more important to the policy basis than the science. It is 
argued that drug, and specifically marijuana, prohibition relies upon “myth” and a “reductionist discourse” to 
obscure the debate around drug policy.331 As an example, the 1961 UN Convention on narcotics developed a list of 
controlled drugs that “reflect[ed] social and cultural practices of the mid-20th century, rather than any 
pharmacological or scientific evidence.”332 Rather an ideological propaganda war was undertaken against “drugs” 
that conflates drug use with drug misuse.333 These representations present “drugs” as casual factors in the increase in 
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societal and criminal problems. However, it has been argued that most drug use is non-problematic. Rather, it is 
argued, the specter of drugs, which has led to prohibition, is a social and political construction, not a scientific based 
fact.334 Again, the U.S. war on drugs can be best understood as a war which has “much to do with who uses the 
drugs and little to do with the risks posed by the drugs.”335 Prohibition creates more harm (societally) through the 
stigma that is generated by a drug conviction as well as the fact that prohibition prevents any regulation which 
would protect users from the content, strength, and purity of the drugs.336  
Legislation of both alcohol and marijuana is rooted very deeply in social and cultural anxiety, the fear of 
the “other”. The labelling of marijuana as a “drug” early on helped to prolong the narrative, as marijuana was 
assumed comparable to other narcotics it shares the Schedule I label with. The series of events that led to present 
day explains (at least in part) why marijuana prohibition has lasted much longer than alcohol.  
Outside and Outsized Influences: The Role of Special Interests 
At this stage, the original impetus, political context, and motivations behind prohibition and in particular 
the prohibition of marijuana seem clear, albeit varied. However, why it has persisted to the present day and became 
a generally partisan issue still seems murky at best.  Is there an underlying lobby/group that is perpetuating the 
prohibition of marijuana in the face of such significant political, social, and scientific evidence to the contrary? Like 
in the case of immigration, did marijuana suffer from enterprising “issue entrepreneurs” who capitalized on the 
degrading relationship between parties and social anxieties to propel marijuana prohibition into the 21st century? It 
seems that without some influential, powerful lobby with deep pockets, the prohibition of marijuana could not have 
persisted as long as it has. Particularly not in the context of an already failed attempt of the prohibition of a 
recreational substance that is at least analogous to marijuana. As previously alluded to, recent years have seen a 
spate of state and local laws aimed at legalizing and/or decriminalization marijuana and its use, public support for 
the legalization of marijuana is at its highest337 (making that support bipartisan in nature), and many law 
enforcement agencies have deprioritized enforcement of related laws, in particular possession, as state governments 
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have worked to expunge the records of those previously convicted under the same laws.338 Despite the fact that 
“overturning prohibition is one of the few hot-button topics with widespread support,”339and that marijuana use and 
cultivation had been legalized in a growing number of states, the federal government has remained at a stalemate, 
unable and/or unwilling to act on what might otherwise be a universally uncontroversial and well-received policy 
effort. In fact, as recently as 2018, then Attorney General Jeff Sessions overturned the Obama-era effort to 
discourage federal prosecutors from interfering with state-cannabis laws, calling it a “return to the rule of law” as 
well as “a return of trust and local control to federal prosecutors who know where and how to deploy Justice 
Department resources most effectively to reduce violent crime, stem the tide of the drug crisis, and dismantle 
criminal gangs.”340 A not-so-subtle hint at marijuana’s role as a “gateway” drug, both to harder drugs and the 
criminal organizations that push them. What forces prompted this about-face in the trend towards legalization? 
A first, perhaps obvious, place to look for the potential influences behind the continued prohibition is by 
the special interests/industries who stand to suffer financially from increased competition in the market. Following 
Arizona’s 2016 passage of Proposition 205, which endeavored to legalize possession of an ounce of marijuana and 
growth of up to six plants for recreational use for Arizona adults aged 21 and over,341 a rash of opposition to the 
legalization of marijuana by pharma and alcohol companies was observed. In the lead up to the vote, a number of 
advertisements aired, "paint[ing] a bleak future for Arizona's children if voters approve[d] Proposition 205."342 
These ads were backed, in large part by a pharmaceutical company (Insys Therapeutics) which manufactures 
prescription painkillers. 
Although concerns for child safety, related to the legalization of recreational marijuana, are not 
unwarranted, many more children are affected by the accidental ingestion of pharmaceuticals than have been by 
intoxication from marijuana in states like Colorado, where recreational marijuana use was legalized in 2014.343 
There was a clear connection between the ad campaign, donations, and anti-legalization rhetoric to a concern for 
                                               
338 Skye Gould and Jeremy Berke, “Illinois just became the first state to legalize marijuana sales through the legislature — here are all the states 
where marijuana is legal,” Business Insider,  January 1, 2020,, https://www.businessinsider.com/legal-marijuana-states-2018-1 (accessed 
1/21/2020). 
339 Ibid. 
340 “Justice Department Issues Memo on Marijuana Enforcement,” justice.gov, January 4, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-issues-memo-marijuana-enforcement.  








market share by pharmaceutical and alcohol companies who saw marijuana as an up-and-coming competitor. In both 
Arizona and Massachusetts, alcohol related associations and PACs represent some of the largest backers of the 
opposition to recreational marijuana.344 In regards to alcohol, these fears were generally unwarranted, as states like 
Colorado, which have legalized recreational marijuana for several years, have not seen significant declines in the use 
of alcohol (relative to legalization). However, the same does not extend to the pharmaceutical companies, who, it is 
argued, are likely to see a loss of market share due to the legalization of recreational/medical marijuana (to the rate 
of roughly 25%).345 Some have also drawn attention to the significant amount of money Medicare stands to save 
should medical marijuana be legalized nationally, due to subsidies provided to cover the cost of (extremely 
expensive) prescription drugs.346 Big pharma, which is rightfully concerned that the introduction of medical and 
recreational marijuana will cut into their revenue, has leveraged their deep pockets to fund an argument based in 
morality to prevent loss of market share for their shareholders.  
In addition to big pharma’s efforts in Arizona, the alcohol industry also played a role in the marijuana 
legalization initiative in Massachusetts in 2016. A political action committee (PAC) representing 16 of the state’s 
beer distributors was one of the top three donors to an anti-legalization group.347 Large beer companies, such as 
Boston Beer Company (parent company of Sam Adams), were concerned that marijuana legalization would 
negatively impact the demand for alcoholic products. However, in other instances, alcohol distributors were actively 
engaged in the conversation about marijuana legalization including in California, which was also facing a ballot 
initiative in 2016. In these cases, distributors saw the economic potential of utilizing the existing supply chain to 
accommodate a new and in demand product (legal marijuana).348 Time has also shown the reality of legalization in 
Colorado, where beer and alcohol sales have seen no adverse effect. Although industry interests may be a partial 
driver of the persistence of marijuana prohibition, the available literature does not paint a picture of large-scale 
coordination or conspiracy, but rather smaller pockets of funding that push the narrative forward in relatively 
ineffective and inconsistent ways.  










Although big business, and special interests, with a profit-driven interest in the continuation of prohibition 
may exist, review of the available literature did not appear to reveal a large scale, coordinated conspiracy. Profit 
driven motivations driven by industry-backed lobbies contribute to driving the anti-legalization narrative forward. 
However, they are lacking in building a substantial case that these factors account for the near century long 
prohibition of marijuana. Additionally, supportive evidence seems to focus on the much more recent time frame, 
suggesting that these lobbies and interests are reactive, responding to the much more recent and significant 
legalization efforts rather than representative of a long-term strategy or conspiracy against marijuana. Ultimately, 
the best evidence against the strength and influence of these interests is the status of the ballot initiatives and laws 
they attempted to combat. In the case of Massachusetts, despite efforts to the contrary, in 2016, voters passed the 
initiative marking the first important step towards legalization.349 By 2018, Massachusetts residents were able to 
legally purchase marijuana for recreational use. According to the state, few of the opponents' worst fears came to 
fruition, rather legalization brought hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue and created thousands of jobs.350 
Arizona’s journey has been slightly different, as Prop 205 was rejected in 2017, however, by an incredibly slim 
margin (less than 1%).351 And as recently as this year, Arizona is gearing up toward reintroducing the initiative on 
the 2020 ballot. Supporters indicating that they anticipate the initiative to pass as the results of the intervening years 
(and other state’s experiments in legalization) will likely have allayed many of the fears of those who rejected the 
bill in its first iteration.352 
Marijuana Policy (in)Action: Toward Federal Decriminalization and Legalization 
Historical context and outside influences help to answer some of the questions behind the persistence of 
prohibition at the federal level but certainly do not answer all of them.  In fact, despite not achieving policy success, 
the federal government has made efforts over the years toward decriminalization and legalization of marijuana. 
Given this, to what does Congress owe its inability to properly respond to popular demand and effectively reform 
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the legal status of marijuana? Two examples, one historical, and one much more recent, provide some insight into 
this very question. 
One of the most important and ambitious federal efforts related to the prohibition of marijuana occurred as 
early as 1972, when then-President Richard M. Nixon commissioned a study on marijuana and drug abuse. It wasn’t 
the first effort, the 1944 La Guardia Committee report from the New York Academy of Medicine also raised 
questions about prohibition finding “marijuana not physically addictive, not a gateway drug and that it did not lead 
to crime.”353 However, the report was labelled unscientific by Harry Anslinger and “prohibition rolled on.”354  
In 1972, at Nixon’s request, the Shafer Commission (so-called after its Chairman Raymond P. Shafer) 
produced an extremely well-researched and comprehensive report, "Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding." The 
report was written with a mind to public policy and the realities of marijuana "the drug" and marijuana "the 
problem.” 355 The report highlighted three factors in how marijuana became defined as a major national problem 
(even while alcohol remains socially and legally acceptable, despite known personal and societal dangers). The 
Commission highlighted in particular: the visible nature of the illegal behavior, the perceived threat to health and 
morality, and the evolution of marijuana as a symbol for wider social conflicts and public issues. The Commission 
attempted to place marijuana rightfully and logically within context, in an attempt to "deflate"356 marijuana as a 
problem and invoked the cultural history in America surrounding the temperance movement and alcohol. The 
Commission also pointed to social changes occurring that may have encouraged people to seek meaning, relevance, 
and certainty through drug use. The Commission aptly concluded that:  
 
"[A] major impediment to rational decision-making in this area is oversimplification. As suggested earlier, 
many ingredients are included in the marihuana mix-medical, legal, social, philosophical, and moral. Many 
observers have tended to isolate one element, highlight it and then extrapolate social policy from that one 
premise. In an area where law, science and morality are so intertwined, we must beware of the tendency 
toward such selectivity."357  
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The Commission recommended against assessing the "relative dangers" of particular drugs, which are only 
meaningful "in a wider context which weighs the possible benefits of the drugs, the comparative scope of their use, 
and their relative impact on society at large."358 As it relates specifically to marijuana, the Commission found there 
was "little proven danger of physical or psychological harm from the experimental or intermittent use of the natural 
preparations of cannabis, including the resinous mixtures commonly used in this country."359 Ultimately, the 
Commission concluded that "society should seek to discourage use, while concentrating its attention on the 
prevention and treatment of heavy and very heavy use."360 Criminalization of possession for personal use was 
"socially self-defeating as a means of achieving this objective."361 In the end, the Commission's report strove to 
"demythologize" marijuana and place marijuana, the problem, in its rightful place in the range of social concerns 
(which, in the Commission’s judgment, was not very high on the list). The Commission deemphasized marihuana as 
a problem calling the existing social and legal policy "out of proportion to the individual and social harm 
engendered by the use of the drug."362 The Commission’s report, non-partisan in nature and commissioned by a 
Republican President, represented an incredibly comprehensive look at the “problem” of marijuana. The report 
ambitiously aimed to define where marijuana belongs in a moral or social argument and further, what the 
government’s role should be in legislating such issues. Despite this, nearly 40 years later, the Commission’s report 
had little to no effect. The reason why provides important insight into one of the main reasons prohibition has 
continued to persist so many decades later, the motivations of the individual who commissioned the report. Nixon 
did not seek to answer a global question about the status of marijuana by commissioning the report, however, saw it 
as an opportunity to push his personal agenda which included one of a partisan nature, against the “antiwar left” and 
“black people.”363 The purpose of the Commission was not to find unbiased and independent answers about a 
national problem, but was intended to assist in one man’s personal agenda, “Nixon saw pot prohibition as a way to 
destroy the anti-war left, according to clandestine recordings made by Nixon in the White House as well as 
statements from his staff to the press. Nixon convened The National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse 
(what became known as the Shafer Commission) to engineer scientific support for cannabis’s Schedule I 
                                               











placement.”364 Despite finding overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Nixon successfully continued his efforts by 
effectively burying the results and placing the matter in the hands of his ally, Attorney General John Mitchell, who 
“placed cannabis in Schedule I in 1972; that same year he resigned to head Nixon’s re-election committee.”365  
Nearly 40 years later, another ambitious effort to tackle the marijuana prohibition problem would occur at 
the federal level, sharing many of the same ideas as the conclusions of the Shafer Commission but with entirely 
different motivations. In 2017, Senator Cory Booker of New Jersey introduced the Marijuana Justice Act of 2017, a 
bill that endeavored to legalize marijuana at the federal level and attempted to address disparities that prohibition 
and incremental legalization have brought to the U.S. Senator Booker addressed the stark difference between the 
communities in which a strong law enforcement approach to marijuana has had drastic economic and social 
consequences for its population, especially low-income and minorities versus communities which have legalized 
marijuana and seen drastic increase in profitability.366  Senator Booker's efforts were unique in that they addressed 
not only the federal classification of marijuana but also the social issues and inequities that have been created and 
worsened by marijuana prohibition.367  As such, Senator Booker's efforts were qualified as "reparatory 
legalization."368  Booker addressed the disproportionate effects on minorities and low-income individuals as the 
most serious of consequences of prohibition, to include long-term effects associated with re-introduction into society 
after incarceration (the most egregious examples being crimes which are non-violent in nature). Senator Booker 
highlighted the national arrest rate for black Americans for marijuana possession versus white Americans (3.73 
times higher) despite the rates of marijuana usage being relatively the same.369 In an attempt to seize on a drastic 
increase in national public support for legalization (60%), Senator Booker introduced what was considered to be the 
most ambitious of all recent legalization efforts, which prescribed five policy fixes aimed at repairing past harms 
and preventing future ones.370 These include removing marijuana from the list of controlled substances, reducing 
federal funding for prison construction and law enforcement activities for states that show racial or class bias in 
marijuana arrest rates, the money saved from the previous effort redirected to a "Community Reinvestment Fund," 
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directing federal courts to expunge all convictions for marijuana use or possession offenses entered prior to the acts 
enactment, as well as making those currently serving time eligible for sentence reductions. The bill also granted a 
"cause of action in federal court to individuals 'aggrieved by a disproportionate arrest [or incarceration] rate.'"371  
However, nearly three years later, with public support for legalization at an all-time high, the bill has seen 
virtually no progress. In 2019, Booker (along with his (only) Democratic co-sponsors) reintroduced the bill.372 
As the stalemate over the issue, and Booker’s bill, remains on Capitol Hill, it is important to examine what 
forces continue to encourage the inaction. With over two-thirds of Americans supporting legalization, more than half 
of the States having passed legislation legalizing marijuana to some extent, and the most pro-marijuana Congress on 
record,373 it is difficult to understand why now isn't the time for Congress to capitalize on an opportunity that would 
appear to be a win for all. 
In this case, it also appeared that partisanship plays a role, in both direct and indirect ways. First, there does 
still appear to be some partisan trend (Republicans generally against national/federal legalization and Democrats 
for), however, this has been challenged by recent changes in state laws and a number of Republicans finding 
themselves representing a constituency that includes a legal cannabis market.374 This is further complicated by the 
fact that public opinion has rapidly shifted to support for legalization and the fact that marijuana has become a 
“burgeoning industry” on the state level, bringing in “roughly $10 billion in sales last year.”375 
However, Booker’s was not the only bill to be introduced in recent years. The SAFE Banking Act, 
sponsored by Colorado Democrat Rep. Ed Perlmutter was cleared through a key house committee in 2019 with an 
“overwhelming bipartisan vote.” The bill, “which would allow banks to do business with cannabis companies 
without fear of federal punishment” was passed with an overwhelming majority in the House in late September. 
Perlmutter’s bill is decidedly more narrow and less controversial than Booker’s, which attempts to both legalize 
marijuana and perhaps more controversially, acknowledge the racial and ethnic inequalities created by its 
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prohibition. Despite being a more palatable compromise, the bill faces increased challenges in the Republican 
controlled Senate, where there remains a negative view on marijuana reform.376 
 Marijuana prohibition has also been affected by partisanship in a less direct way. As was previously alluded 
to, the increase in public support for marijuana prohibition has, inconveniently, coincided with the increasingly 
hyperpartisan environment in D.C. It doesn’t appear that this has led to an increased and more intractable divide 
amongst Republicans and Democrats on the issue, as support for legalization continues to grow at the Congressional 
level too. However, the hyperpartisan environment has created a number of distractions that perhaps have prevented 
Congress from tackling this issue. Although important and clearly supported by public opinion, in the context of 
debates regarding border security, war powers, and even the impeachment of a sitting President, it just doesn’t rise 
to the top of the list of priorities.  It doesn’t appear that many continue to argue the social ills of marijuana, rather, 
the debate centers on how narrow or broad to make the legislation.  
CONCLUSIONS: 
 In closing, through a thorough examination of marijuana prohibition in social and historical 
context, several themes about the legislation of moral issues during times of partisan upheaval became evident. In 
the case of issues rooted in morality, historical and social context is as important to understanding policy (in) action 
as is partisanship. There are important similarities between alcohol prohibition and that of marijuana– race, culture, 
social norms, and fear of change. One cannot examine issues of “moral” consequence without understanding them in 
historical and social context. Inevitably, in the case of marijuana prohibition, the existential fear that one group feels 
toward another must be understood as a major catalyst. 
Additionally, although outside influences (special interests and lobbies) have played a role, they don’t 
alone (or significantly) account for the continued prohibition of marijuana. There did not appear to be literature to 
support the theory that prohibition was underwritten by some far-reaching conspiracy of interests.  As such, it is 
difficult to ascertain if a lack of literature on a feature of the issue (for instance, funding of the anti-legalization 
lobby) is a function of the non-existence of such activity or simply a lack of research into the matter.   
                                               





The partisan nature of the debate also appears to be more complex than initially presumed. Although there 
is certainly a partisan divide on the issue, it has never been weaker or more narrow. The American public has made 
clear that there is bipartisan support for marijuana legalization and the states continue to support this by passing bills 
decriminalizing and/or legalizing the substance. However, as public support has grown, so has the hyperpartisan 
environment in Washington. Although Congress too has seen an increase in support for tackling the issue, the 
greater issue, related to partisanship, seems to be the distraction the hyperpartisan environment has created. With 
Congress busy tackling highly partisan debates ranging from immigration, war, and impeachment, there is little time 
and/or energy to devote to an issue of seemingly less urgency. 
Unlike the issue of immigration, in the case of marijuana prohibition, “issue entrepreneurs” might be better 
understood as “issue influencers.” These individuals utilized strategic and influential positions to push personal (and 
self-serving) agendas. In the face of majority support for legalization, Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ 2018 
statement regarding the federal commitment to marijuana prohibition can also be seen in a new light, perhaps one 
similar to the likes of Anslinger, Nixon, and Regan. It’s doubtful any of these individuals saw themselves as “issue 
entrepreneurs” in some of the ways described above and in chapter two, however, in each of these cases, marijuana 
was exploited to promote these individual’s ends, the will and wants of the individual taking precedence over the 
will of the people. Each of these individuals happened to be in positions that afforded them incredible power to 
shape the future of marijuana prohibition at critical times in history. 
Finally, perhaps the most important takeaway is the critical role culture plays in understanding why certain 
narratives stick and others struggle to gain support, and further, what propels certain issues to become highly 
controversial and/or partisan. The NRA provided an excellent example of how strategic consideration of narrative 
and framing within cultural context could successfully push a particular agenda. The NRA is probably not often 
thought of as a progressive group, but by recognizing the futility of certain arguments and embracing (in part) a 
progressive narrative, the group was able to pivot, reframe, and find continued legal support for their agenda. Much 
like for the case of gun control, the most powerful and successful narratives concerning the prohibition of marijuana 
have been strategically entrenched in overarching cultural frames that supported its continuance. It has been well 
established that the prohibition of marijuana arose from the question of what it means to be an American, or perhaps 




future, enterprising politicians and members of the public should consider how a strategic rethinking and reframing 
of the narrative could further sway those who have stalled efforts to bring federal law in line with the state and local. 
These themes not only support a better understanding of the issue of marijuana prohibition, but more 
broadly the intractability of the current political environment, and more specifically the forces that have prevented 
policy successes on the issues Americans care about and demand action on the most. In a representative democracy, 
like the U.S., the system should respond to the will of the people, particularly when that will represents a majority. 
The persistence of marijuana prohibition shows the complexity of issues like those explored in depth in this 
thesis. The forces at play are many and varied, each on its own likely insufficient to support the decades long 
prohibition and continued congressional inaction. Each individual contributor to the problem has led to a confluence 
of influences that have pushed marijuana prohibition into a future unforeseen by many and in contrast to the will of 
the American public. Only time will tell if the wave of hyperpartisanship in Washington will subside enough to 





“American politics has arrived at a remarkable place. The country and its leaders are growing more 
partisan, fewer people are persuadable in elections, and Republicans and Democrats view each other with an 
increasingly nastier edge. Americans are surrounding themselves with people who look like, agree with and even 
pray like them — a sorting that's changing the country and ripping at the fabric of what it means to be 
American.” Domenico Montanaro, NPR377 
 
“Human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability.” Martin Luther King Jr.378 
 Reeling from the partisan fervor of the conclusion of the impeachment trial of Donald Trump, a weary 
American public is bracing itself for what is likely to be an equally, if not increasingly, partisan effort: the 2020 
Presidential election. With impeachment now in its rearview mirror, Congress has an opportunity to set divisions 
aside and do the work bestowed upon it by the people. However, with the 2020 presidential election looming, it 
seems unlikely that the divide that has grown so large over the last two decades will close at all in this narrow 
window of time or that Congress will capitalize on this brief interlude.  In fact, as the election draws nearer, it is 
likely that that gap will grow, and full focus will be dedicated to the most important task at hand, party majorities. It 
is likely that little that occurs over the election cycle will do much to quell the concerns of the public that 
Washington D.C. (and the U.S.) is gripped by an uncivil, untenable, and disturbing level of partisanship. However, 
in looking past this election cycle and back through the conclusions of this thesis, hope remains. 
 At the outset, this effort endeavored to examine whether or not the hyperpartisanship that appears to have a 
hold on the nation, and more importantly its representative body, has changed some of the most fundamental 
functions of U.S. democracy, namely how Congress responds to public demand and how public policy is made. 
American’s perceptions of Congress are at all-time lows as the stalemate over a number of policies has grown. 
American democracy, by design, requires not just checks and balances, but collaboration, cooperation, and 
compromise in order to address issues of real consequence. As previously noted, as the national and global 
landscapes shift, Congress must be prepared not only to address and legislate issues of administrative significance 
(budgets and the like), but also to design and reform policy that helps define what it means to be an American, both 
at home and in the world. This type of policy making and reform requires the ability to set aside party differences to 
do the work of the American public. If Congress has lost the ability to overcome this challenge. the consequences to 
the health of U.S. democracy are severe. 
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 The three preceding chapters attempted to look at aspects of these factors in the context of some of these 
very issues - controversial, complex, and defining matters. Some may argue that the choice of issues (gun control, 
immigration and the prohibition of marijuana) precipitated a necessary conclusion. That by choosing three issues 
that were naturally more controversial and partisan, this presented an unfair test of Congressional function. 
However, these three issues were chosen not due to their controversial nature (in order to support the overarching 
thesis), but because public demand for policy action on each issue has grown exponentially over the years. Federal 
reform of each of the three issues remains among the top priorities for a majority of Americans across party lines. In 
addition to its more mundane tasks and duties, Congress must also be able to tackle the big issues the public 
demands of it, as it has during other periods in history. Certainly there is not bipartisan public consensus about 
exactly the shape these reforms should take, but that is the work of Congress, to pull up the proverbial chair, roll up 
the sleeves, and do the hard work, negotiating toward a policy end that reflects the will of the people and the essence 
of American democracy. 
 In each instance, and in each chapter, the conclusions were more complex than anticipated. However, one 
overarching theme appeared throughout. Although hyperpartisanship is now a factor in policy stalemate, it is as 
much a symptom of broader issues as it is a cause. Certain aspects of, and evolutions in, the system’s design 
have exacerbated a problem that has always existed - people just don’t always agree. As the “People’s 
Branch,” Congress is both representative and reflective of this phenomenon. 
Chapter one assessed whether hyperpartisanship was responsible for the lack of meaningful policy reform 
following several mass shootings in the U.S. (and growing bipartisan) demand for reform. In this context, chapter 
one also questioned whether the conditions previously believed to be required for the mechanisms of the nation’s 
democratic policy machine to engage had fundamentally shifted.  
An examination of the issue through the lens of mass shootings as focusing events revealed that the issue is 
about more than just partisanship, polarization, and rhetoric. However, in the case of mass shootings and gun control, 
the hyperpartisanship that has emerged over the last 20 years appears to be the factor that makes it impossible to 
overcome the others (e.g., such as strong opposing lobbies, thinner margins of power, concerns about self-preservation, 
the 24-hour news cycle, and the polarized nature of the issue itself). 
Dovetailing on the findings of chapter one, chapter two attempted to address whether the phenomenon of 




the lens of immigration, an issue which has traditionally been firmly within the purview of the federal government 
and has become one of the most divisive and highest priority issues facing Congress and the administration, chapter 
two examined the foundations of American federalism and the division of power between the states and federal 
government, historical precedents for adoption of national issues on the state level, and utilized immigration as a test 
case. The chapter found that in the face of a hyperpartisan Washington D.C., states will be challenged to creatively 
take on policymaking far beyond their usual scope. This could prove both a sustainable alternative to a deadlocked 
D.C., but also may indicate a more significant long-term trend of a shift away from the perceived supremacy of the 
federal government. 
The conclusions of chapter two showed that some of the presuppositions held true, hyperpartisanship has a 
hold on Congress and a real effect on policy (or the lack thereof), in particular: immigration reform. Federal inaction 
on immigration was a familiar refrain amongst those states pursuing both permissive and restrictive sub-federal 
legislation. In addition, immigration federalism was bolstered by a number of court decisions which denied that sub-
federal legislation ran afoul of federal supremacy and/or preemption. However, there also appeared to be limited 
empirical evidence supporting the successes of sub-federal efforts, leaving the strong rhetoric inspiring and supporting 
the policy initiatives largely unsubstantiated in many cases and raising big questions about the advisability of 
piecemeal/patchwork efforts in a nation that is built on the unification of diverse parts. Additionally, many of the sub-
federal efforts themselves appeared to have partisan origins. Generally speaking, the sub-federal efforts were more a 
symptom of hyperpartisanship than they were a solution to it.  
The importance of the phenomenon of issue entrepreneurs also emerged in the examination of immigration 
federalism. Issue entrepreneurs were understood to be a “handful of dedicated policy activists” who capitalized on 
“political opportunities to block immigration reform at the national level and then proliferate restrictive legislation at 
the local level.”379 In the case of immigration, by leveraging powerful narratives and an opportune (read partisan) 
political climate, these individuals had a relatively outsized influence on both public opinion and the resultant policy 
action. It seemed logical that other similar issues may have suffered a similar fate. 
Chapter three turned to the evolution of the prohibition of marijuana over the years as a case study of how 
outside influences (and influencers) might stall necessary and desired policy action, as well as exacerbate partisan 
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tensions over the issue. Specifically, the chapter examined the possibility that the prohibition of marijuana has 
persisted not for reasons rooted in science and logic, but due to the influence of some underlying interests, motivated 
by profit or power, emboldened by the political opportunity presented by a hyperpartisan environment.  Of the three 
issues profiled, marijuana enjoys some of the broadest, most diverse, and longest support. There is also far greater 
bipartisan consensus on how to approach legalization of marijuana than there is for gun control and immigration. 
It was certainly evident that particular individuals had capitalized on the emotional component of marijuana 
prohibition. Morality issues, which attempt to legislate what and who is right and wrong, have deep emotional cores 
embedded with society’s deepest fears and insecurities. These issues, including marijuana, are generally reflective of 
these insecurities. The strong emotional connection means that policy measures that attempt to counteract the 
behavior/substance/activity can be wildly unsuccessful (by any measure) at achieving their ends and still find public 
support. Enterprising and influential individuals have understood this, and over the years have used that fear to push 
their own personal agendas through the continued prohibition of marijuana. Anslinger, Nixon, and even Nancy 
Reagan, each examples of how the mythology of marijuana could be exploited to promote these individual ends. Each 
of these individuals happened to be in positions that afforded them incredible power to shape the future of marijuana 
prohibition at critical times in history.  
Although, hyperpartisanship also plays a role in why prohibition has not ended, the partisan divide on the 
issue has never been weaker or more narrow. The American public has made clear that there is bipartisan support for 
marijuana legalization and the states continue to support this by passing bills decriminalizing and/or legalizing the 
substance. However, as public support has grown, so has the hyperpartisan environment in Washington. Although 
Congress too has seen an increase in support for tackling the issue, the greater issue, related to partisanship, seems to 
be the distraction the hyperpartisan environment has created. With Congress busy tackling highly partisan debates 
ranging from immigration, war, and impeachment, there is little time and/or energy to devote to an issue of seemingly 
less urgency. The challenge then, if the issue is a priority for the American people, is how to elevate it.  
Perhaps the most interesting conclusion from chapter three concerned how to overcome the policy deadlock 
and build a consensus and a compelling narrative of support. The “anti” lobbies seem to be more powerful, visible, 
and influential than the “pro” lobbies. Perhaps this is because it is much easier to cater to fears than hopes. But to 
develop a compelling narrative that is “pro-marijuana” (or gun control, or immigration for that matter) it is critical to 




a particular agenda through strategic consideration of narrative and framing within cultural context. By recognizing 
the futility of certain arguments and embracing (in part) a progressive narrative, the group was able to pivot, 
reframe, and find continued legal support for their agenda. As chapter one explored, the reframing of the opioid 
crisis as a health crisis achieved similarly successful ends and, perhaps, broadly shifted the public’s (and Congress’) 
opinion on understanding accountability and drug addiction. Much like for the case of gun control, the most 
powerful and successful narratives concerning the prohibition of marijuana have been strategically entrenched in 
overarching cultural frames that supported its continuance. If decriminalization is indeed the will of the people, and 
way of the future, enterprising politicians and members of the public should consider this carefully when drafting a 
narrative that will have broad appeal to a divisive Congress.  
Although framing emerged as an interesting and important component for how to overcome the hyperpartisan 
divide, build consensus, and end policy deadlock on particular issues, it wasn’t the only alternative that emerged that 
could help to shape the future of democracy. As were briefly mentioned, a more party-diverse Congress might ease 
the perceived personal and professional costs associated with Democrats and Republicans engaging in across the aisle 
compromise. It seems unlikely that the U.S. will undergo a drastic change to its fundamental design, so perhaps less 
drastic measures such as ranked choice voting, or term limits could provide a path for more moderate politicians, third 
parties and independent candidates to break the traditionally bipartisan hold. It will be important and interesting to 
watch the State of Maine as they employ ranked choice voting in the 2020 election.380  
Removing money from politics and reducing the influence, power, and effectiveness of professional lobbies 
would allow politicians to approach issues based on merit and public need rather than out of concern for self-
preservation and financing. Bernie Sanders is running his 2020 presidential campaign in part on the platform of 
campaign finance reform finding that that the “influence of wealthy individuals and corporations in elections has led 
to the passage of laws that have widened the chasm between the rich and the poor.”381 But the refrain isn’t uniquely 
Sander’s, or even liberal/progressive, candidates from both parties have argued about the negative effects money has 
had on elections and the candidates who become members of Congress. Solutions could include publicly funded 
elections, overturning Citizens United, passing an act to increase disclosure and transparency, matching funds from 
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the federal government and incentivizing individual contributions (through tax credits.)382 Not only could these efforts 
make elections more fair and diverse but they may also free up politicians who are otherwise, “spending hours each 
day dialing for dollars rather than working on legislation or helping their constituents.”383 
The conclusions of chapter three also made clear that the role “hyperpartisanship” itself plays in the deadlock 
is complex. Hyperpartisanship is not simply a cause of deadlock, but is also a symptom of other exacerbating factors, 
two of which bear brief mention here but are themselves deserving of a thesis of their own: the role of new media and 
the partisan nature of gerrymandering.   
Over the last several decades, and certainly since the advent of the 24/7 news cycle, the media has transformed 
political news into a form of entertainment. This has had several deleterious effects. First, it has heightened and 
exaggerated divisions, both at the Congressional and local level. Media coverage has itself become highly partisan, a 
person’s news broadcast of choice a veritable thermometer of political leanings. Therefore, the “news” one selects 
mainly provides a constant loop of already subscribed-to beliefs and agendas, rather than providing an unbiased 
representation of fact. Compounded with the advent of social media, which has proven to provide a haven for 
disinformation operations for foreign adversaries, it has become harder and harder to find a source of news that does 
little more than stoke existing partisan fires. Additionally, the 24/7 nature of both the traditional news and social media 
platforms have drastically sharpened the microscope under which members of Congress find themselves. Although 
this may have positive aspects (increased transparency), it also means that many of the conversations and 
collaborations that might have previously required closed door meetings are likely to be exposed. This has increased 
the cost of cooperation to members of Congress to cross party lines. As politicians eye the upcoming election cycle, 
decisions about policy and collaboration must be made with sensitivity to how they will be publicly represented and 
perceived, rather than on their general merits. 
 Gerrymandering represents another phenomenon that has served to both increase partisan divides and 
decrease competition and diversity of parties and opinions in D.C. Seen by some as one of “democracy’s worst 
problems,” the process through which districts are reshaped to reflect demographic shifts “often has more to do with 
politics than demographic and geographic correctness.”384 The justification for gerrymandering is to attempt to ensure 
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adequate representation, however, this has been exploited by enterprising legislatures to ensure reelection. In recent 
years, the Supreme Court has declined to weigh in on the issue (even in the face of discriminatory claims) leaving the 
issue of gerrymandering to Congress and the states.385 One possible solution, suggested by political scientists from 
Harvard and Boston University, has been to turn the process into a “Define and Combine” procedure, giving the 
majority party the power to define the subdistricts but the minority the power to combine them, “[b]oth sides are very 
aware that their opponent will use its move to get to as advantageous a map as possible. When drawing the original 
group of subdistricts, the majority party will be thinking about how the minority is likely to combine them. The 
minority party must anticipate how the majority is likely to draw the subdistricts and have a corresponding strategy 
for recombining them. By giving each party one move, the Define and Combine strategy reduces parties’ ability to 
pack or crack.”386 Ultimately, the process was found to produce more moderate districts, representing a potential 
counterbalance to the negative, and partisan, influences the process has grown to inflict. 
Although chapter two also examined the delegation of some powers to the states as well as the states’ efforts 
to legislate federal issues, neither really seemed to suggest a viable way forward for the issue at hand (immigration) 
but did highlight the tension inherent in the U.S.’ democracy, to be both individual and united. The U.S., as long as it 
remains united, will remain in this constant struggle. Certainly, this era of hyperpartisanship, although extreme, is not 
unique. The U.S., and its democratic institutions, have survived a Civil War, McCarthyism, and the civil rights 
movement, each time emerging from the bitter, and hateful, battle having grown, evolved, and with a better 
understanding of what exactly it means to be American, rooted in the founding and most enduring principles - freedom, 
justice, and equality.  
This portfolio itself was perhaps also rooted in the writer’s own existential fears about the U.S. the future 
holds, but it is the devotion to those founding principles, over any individual gain, that have made the U.S. democratic 
experiment the most successful and long lasting. Even in the most divisive and partisan moments, there is reason for 
hope. As this thesis explored, Americans, despite their differences, consistently move the bar toward a more fair, 
equal, just, and inclusive society.  
In addition, despite the vicious and partisan nature of the recent impeachment trial and the anticipated similar 
nature of the upcoming presidential campaign, it is worth noting that in the face of another public health crisis, 
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Congress has been able to coalesce. Much like in the case of the opioid crisis (as detailed in chapter one), in January 
of this year, Congress passed the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act. In the 
most recent days, with unanimous support, the House passed a revised coronavirus emergency bill, intended to inject 
billions of dollars into the U.S. economy.387 Despite “imperfections,” the bill was expected to clear the Senate with 
bipartisan majorities.388 In the face of a national crisis, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell stated, “It is a well-
intentioned bipartisan product assembled by House Democrats and President Trump’s team that tries to stand up and 
expand some new relief measures for American workers.”389 Expectations proved to be accurate. Within days, the 
Senate passed the House legislation with no changes and again, with bipartisan majorities. The legislation was then 
immediately signed into law by the President. Most importantly, the legislation itself was negotiated between House 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D) and administration representative, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. Despite intense 
animosity between Pelosi and the administration, the “two parties ‘are putting aside partisanship to get things 
done.’”390 Not unlike the days following 9/11, the current crisis facing all Americans may very well provide an 
opportunity and cause around which Americans, no matter their color or creed, can unite.  
Although the hyperpartisanship that has plagued the start of the 21st century may be seen as not only a root 
of policy deadlock but a symptom of broken systems, it may also be a sign of a coming societal shift. Hyperpartisanship 
itself is not necessarily as determinative as originally thought, but rather is reflective of a general social context.  If 
history repeats itself, the U.S. may emerge bruised and battered but a stronger, more evolved version of itself. Through 
a variety of efforts, including those mentioned above (multi-party system, redistricting reform, civic education, 
removing money from politics, responsible journalism, etc.) the U.S. may be able to work to curb the grip partisanship 
has on both the people and Congress alike. In a political system dependent on cooperation, negotiation, fair 
representation, and equality and justice, this is not just preferred, it is necessary.   
As the U.S. hurdles into uncharted territory, the current crisis may also give the U.S. the proverbial push it 
needs. In order to overcome the worst possibilities of the coronavirus threat, Americans must overcome differences, 
put personal preferences aside, and work together to ensure a better future. So far, the outlook is promising. In the 
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face of catastrophe, the partisan has taken a back seat to the essential. The worst of the crisis is certainly yet to come, 
but hopefully Americans will continue their efforts to work together, staving off the worst-case scenario. The challenge 
will be to resist the urge to fall back into the divisions that have plagued the country and put unprecedented pressure 
on America's democratic institutions. Through a sustained collective and collaborative effort, the U.S., its people and 
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